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Article 2

THE GERMAN LLEWELLYN
Michael Ansaldi*
Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust.
INTRODUCTION

Karl Nickerson Llewellyn (1893-1962) is generally considered to rank among the foremost legal scholars America has produced in this century. His place in the pantheon of American
jurisprudence seems today, upon the hundredth anniversary of
his birth and nearly a third of a century after his death, as secure as such places ever are. 1 Even so, legal academics, law stu* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College. A.B. 1975, Columbia; J.D. 1983, Yale;
M.A. 1986, Oxford. I would like to thank George Brown, J. Allen Smith and Alfred
Chueh-Chin Yen, who generously gave me the benefit of their acute responses to this
work, as well as Lawrence George, Robert W. Gordon, Joseph Jacobs and Walter
Weyrauch, who read an earlier version of portions of this Article, for their perceptive
comments. Stephen Conrad, Michael Grossberg, Andrzej Rapaczynski, and Michael B.W.
Sinclair shared their ideas about an earlier version of a portion of this paper presented to
a panel on "Common Law Jurisprudence as a Social Science" at a conference of the
Social Science History Association. Carlos Petit Calvo of the Universitat Autbnoma de
Barcelona helped me clear up a long-standing mystery in one of Llewellyn's German
books and for that I am very much in his debt. I also wish to thank the University of
Chicago's Law Library for permission to quote from materials in the Karl Llewellyn Papers, as well as Boston College and Florida State University for their generous support of
the research and writing of this Article.
The translations in this Article are those of the author unless otherwise noted. The
Brooklyn Law Review has relied on the author for citation style and substance for many
of the foreign sources used in this Article. The Review would like to thank Brooklyn Law
School student Cynthia Stone for her assistance in proofreading the German-language
materials quoted in this Article.
I Some summary assessments of Llewellyn: "the undisputed guru of [Legal] Realism" (MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AImmcAN LAw 1870-1960 171
(1992)); "[O]ne of the most interesting and original figures in twentieth-century American jurisprudence." (GRANT Gxio0RE, THE AGEs OF AimEcAN LAw 115 n.l (1977)); "the
most fertile and inventive legal scholar of his generation" (WMLWA TvWiNWo. KAM
RTHEAs Movwhmrr vi (Univ. of Okla. 1985) (1973)); "spokesman
LaxW=YN AND
and most important leader of the legal realists" (Manfred Rehbinder, Karl N. Llewellyn
als Rechtssoziologe, 18 KOLNER ZFrrscHRI I FOP SOZIOLOGIE UND SOzsLA'SCHOLOGI 532

(1966)); "He was a man of uncommonly strong creative intellect, a forceful disposition
[eine Kraftnatur], a fighter for law and justice, a man who marvelled at the Beautiful in
art and nature. He was an American through and through, and through and through a
citizen of the world." (Max Rheinstein, Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962, 27 Zzrr-
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dents, practitioners and scholars from other fields would probably each describe that place somewhat differently, since the
2
accomplishments of his career straddle the usual dividing lines.
Nevertheless, one aspect of his work that has remained virtually unknown is the substantial body of German-language material Llewellyn produced at a formative stage of his jurisprudential development.' Consequently, this Article seeks to give an
account of the Llewellyn Germanica, in particular of the two
major, closely connected works Llewellyn wrote in German at a

"the
greatest Realist of the 1930's" (Bruce Ackerman, Book Review, 104 DAEDALUS 119, 129
n.27 (1974)); "one of the ablest, subtlest most hard-working of Holmes' disciples" (Karl
Llewellyn, Law Expert, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1962, at 29 (quoting Jerome Frank));
"[Llewellyn's earlier work was] the most basic and thoroughly thought-out sociological
theory of law which has yet appeared." (id., quoting Roscoe Pound).
This is not to say that Llewellyn was without his detractors. TwINING, supra, at 114.
But at least for the moment, the "Karlo-philes" seem to have carried the day over the
"Karlo-phobes."
2 The achievement for which practicing lawyers best remember him is probably his
role in drafting the Uniform Commercial Code. See TWINING, supra note 1, at 270-340.
He is also remembered for the groundbreaking CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
SALES (1930); his 1929-30 Columbia lectures published under the title of BRAMBLE BUeSH
(1930), a vade mecum for beginning law students; and THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
(1960), a magisterial study of the appellate decisionmaking process. Almost as well
known is his collaboration, certainly the first of its kind in American law, with anthropologist E.A. Hoebel on field work on a southern Montana Indian reservation, resulting
in THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941), applying the "case method" to a study of dispute resolution among the Cheyenne.
3 The German-language works include:
SCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 601, 605 (1962));

1. PRXJUDIZIENRECHT
UND
RECHTSPRECHUNG
IN
AMERIKA
(1933)
[hereinafter
PRXJUDIZIENRECHT], translated under the title THE CASE LAW SYSTEM INAMERICA (Paul

Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans. 1989) [hereinafter CLSA]. The work, written between 1928 and 1932, was published by Theodor Weicher Verlag, an academic press in
Leipzig, Germany. Citations to this work will be to CLSA, the 1989 English translation,
except where otherwise indicated. For information on the genesis of this book, see infra
notes 31-41 and accompanying text;
2. the posthumously published

RECHT, RECHTSLEBEN UND GESELLSCHAFT

[LAW, THE LIFE

(Manfred Rehbinder ed. 1977) [hereinafter RRG]. It has not
yet been translated into English. For information on the genesis of the book, see infra
notes 63-64 and accompanying text;
3. two essays in German law reviews, OIber den Rechtsunterricht in den Vereinigten
Staaten [Legal Education in the United States], 79 JHERINGS JARBUCH 233-66 (192829) and Die deutsche Justiz vom Standpunkt eines amerikanischenJuristen [An American Lawyer Looks at German Justice], 1932 Ju~isiscHE WOCHENSCHmlrr 556;
4. Das Recht in der Gesellschaft [Law in Society] (unpublished manuscript); and
5. miscellaneous unpublished guest lectures at German universities and German-language poems, located among his papers in the collection of the library of The Law School
of the University of Chicago.
OF THE LAW AND SOCIETY]
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seminal stage in his career, between 1928 to 1932:
Priijudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika and Recht,
Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft.'
After first providing background information on the history
and genesis of these works, this Article presents an overview of
the arguments of greatest jurisprudential significance. This Article demonstrates that the works constitute a thematic whole,
presenting a unified statement of the young Llewellyn's vision
of, and hopes for, the nascent Realist movement. At the heart of
both books is the enduring ideal of legal certainty. Although he
rejects the pseudoscientific Langdellian schema for its attainment, 5 Liewellyn nonetheless continues to identify certainty as a
primary value of legality, while offering an unorthodox, socialscience assessment of how much there is and where it may be
found. In so doing, he outlines an approach quite unlike the corrosive mockery of certainty articulated by his contemporary and
sometime partner Jerome Frank. Llewellyn also provides a measured, rather than radical, critique of legal rules. He believes
them to play a key, if not always dispositive, role in the highly
predictable operation of the case law system, vital elements in
the complex interplay of subjective and objective factors in adjudication. Yet using linguistic theory, he is also able to provide a
persuasive account of how an ideologically static precedent system can make changes without violating its narrow conception of
the judicial function. In Llewellyn's view, this mixture of change
and continuity results less often from conscious and careful balancing than from the social forces at work on the judiciary and
in the wider world. Thus, much of Llewellyn's effort is directed
at championing a new, sociological understanding of how law
works in the context of its social environment.
The Article then concludes with a brief assessment of the
significance of these works and their place in the history of Legal Realism and the Llewellyn canon.

'See

supra note 3.

See infra text accompanying notes 99-101. One topic with which this Article does
not deal is the attempt to delineate the influence of German law and legal scholarship on
Llewellyn's later work on the Uniform Commercial Code. See generallyJames Whitman,
Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk. A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources
for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Ymx L.J. 156 (1987).
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BACKGROUND

A. Llewellyn's German'
Because of Llewellyn's undeniably Germanic first name
"Karl," one is tempted to explain the existence of his German
works by supposing that he was of German ancestry and thus,
presumably, raised in a German-speaking household. But this
was not the case: Llewellyn's father, William, was an immigrant
to America from Wales; his mother Janet bore the equally Welsh
maiden name of George.7 To every appearance, the Llewellyn
household was monoglot. Young Karl Llewellyn is likely to have
made his first acquaintance with German at some point in his
primary or secondary education, possibly at Boys High School in
Brooklyn, New York where the Llewellyns had moved from
Washington State shortly after Karl's birth.
By age sixteen, however, "such was his intellectual promise.
[that the Boys High S]chool had nothing to offer [Karl] academically."' His parents therefore decided to send him to a German Gymnasium before he started college.9 Llewellyn spent
three years at school in Schwerin/Mecklenburg in northeast Germany, perfecting his knowledge of German as well as learning
the local dialect. William Twining, Llewellyn's biographer, describes him as "bilingual" by the end of this period. 10 Several
years later, as an undergraduate on leave from Yale College,
Llewellyn returned to Europe where he served briefly as a volun' See generally TWINING, supra note 1, at 89-91. Ulrich Drobnig's unpublished manuscript "Llewellyn and Germany" is only known to the author through William Twining's account of it. See id. at 413 n.8 (indicating Twining's use of Drobnig's paper as the
chief source for his account of Llewellyn's sojourns in Germany).
I For the information that the surname "George" is Welsh I am indebted to my
homonymous colleague thanked at the beginning of this article. Llewellyn's parents apparently chose the name "Karl" after a character in THE STUDENT PRINCE. TWININO,
supra note 1, at 87.
8 Id.at 89.
It is apparently just a matter of chance that the book we have is PRXJUDIZIENRECHT
UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA rather than DRorr DECISIONNEL ET JURISPRUDENCE EN
AMERIQUE. Llewellyn's father happened to meet a German-American acquaintance in a
drugstore and told him that he wished to send his son abroad to further his education,
either in Germany or France. This acquaintance happened to have a brother living in
Schwerin, in the Mecklenburg region of eastern Germany. Hence, it was to the
Realgymnasium in Schwerin that Llewellyn went. Indeed, it was in the house of this
brother, a teacher, that the young Karl lived during his time at the Gymnasium.
Rehbinder, supra note 1, at 553 n.3.
10 TWINING, supra note 1, at 89; see id. at 89-91 & 479-87.
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teer in the German army during the Great War, a feat of derring-do requiring near-native fluency in the language of his fellow combatants.1 Llewellyn's German obviously was very
good,12 if not perfect:13 two knowledgeable scholars, readers of
both English and German, stated that they very much preferred
Llewellyn's German prose style to his English.1
11A detailed discussion of Llewellyn's youthful contacts with Germany is beyond
the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, I might just add one detail to Twining's account,
TWINING, supra note 1, at 479-87, of Llewellyn's famous "war adventure" in which he
volunteered and served in the German army in World War I, culminating in his being
injured in the first battle of Ypres and receiving the Iron Cross (second clas). Twining's
account judiciously sifts a number of source materials, most of which, however, ultimately derive from Llewellyn's own accounts of his "adventure." Twining indicates that
Llewellyn's motivations for joining up, while studying in Paris on leave from Yale College, were compounded of a desire for adventure, pro-German sympathies, revulsion at
the extremes of anti-German sentiment in France, and the like.
To all these factors there can be added another factor of which Twining was apparently unaware: love or, more precisely, a desire to impress the highly patriotic family of a
young woman, Else Hagen, with whom he was then "as good as engaged." This information derives from Llewellyn's close Gymnasium friend Hans Lachmund, with whom
Llewellyn discussed his war adventure both at the time and subsequently. Letter from
Hans Lachmund to Manfred Rehbinder, cited in Manfred Rehbinder, Editor's Introduction, RRG, supra note 3, at 10 [hereinafter Rebbinder, Editor's Introduction].
Lachmund also says that Llewellyn explicitly denied enlisting because he considered the
German cause just.
12 The Llewellyn papers at the University of Chicago hear witness to an extensive
correspondence that Llewellyn was able to carry on in German over most of his adult
life, both with colleagues and personal friends. Furthermore, Llewellyn was able to teach
two courses in German at the University of Leipzig.
3 In his preface to PRXAurD IENmscrE=, Llewellyn thanks a number of people for going over and correcting the German of the manuscript. CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxvxxxvi.
14 TWINING, supra note 1, at 89. As someone who has spent a fair amount of time
poring over and translating Llewellyn's German, and who finds his English at times
rather trying, I mostly concur in this reaction (while recognizing that such things are, to
a great extent, a matter of taste). The clarity of PRXJUDIZENRECHT seems startling when
compared with the murky prose of, for example, Llewellyn's 1942 article American Common Law Tradition and American Democracy, 1 J. LEG.& POL Soc. 14, reprinted in
KARL N. LLEwELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: RFALIS! IN THEORY ND PRACT"ICE 282 (1962). Lon
Fuller had a similar reaction:
If [PRXjuPzNxxcHT is translated into English], I should like to add the personal wish that the Teutonic sense of order which seems to pervade the style
and arrangement of the present work may carry over into the English edition.
For the book as it now stands offers an irrefutable demonstration of the fact
that vigor and originality of thought are not necessarily incompatible with a
degree of stylistic discipline.
Lon Fuller, Prnjudizienrechtund ReOhtsprechung in Amerika, 82 U. PA. L. Rm. 551,
553 (1934) (book review). The "discipline" may derive from the German reader-editors of
Llewellyn's manuscript. See supra note 13.
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B. Leipzig I: 1928-29
Upon discharge from the Kaiser's army, Llewellyn returned
to Yale College, from which he was graduated in 1915. He went
on to earn his LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1918. Thereafter
he remained at Yale, teaching commercial law and partnership
and also reading for the J.D. degree, awarded to him in 1920. In
that year Llewellyn went to New York City to work in the legal
department of National City Bank (a corporate ancestor of today's Citibank)."5 In 1922 he returned to Yale as an assistant
professor, receiving a promotion to associate professor the year
following.
After serving on the Yale Law School faculty for a short period, Llewellyn migrated back to New York in 1924. (His first
wife Elizabeth Sanford was a graduate student in economics at
Columbia University.) At first he continued to teach at Yale,
commuting to New Haven, while also teaching at Columbia as a
visiting professor. Ultimately, however, he found it necessary to
relinquish his position at Yale and in 1925 he was appointed to
the faculty of the Columbia Law School. There he devoted himself to teaching and research in the area of commercial law.
Shortly after Llewellyn's arrival, Columbia commenced its
By the same token, Llewelyn's German also sounds rather "flatter" and less
stamped with his distinctive personality than his English. This is admittedly the judgment of the author, a non-native speaker of German, who thus lacks a native's
Sprachgefahl; others may well disagree. See, e.g., Rheinstein, supra note 1, at 604
(describing the German prose style of PRAJUDIZIENRECHT as just as strongly idiosyncratic
[eigenwillig] as Llewellyn's English writings). The chief virtue of Llewellyn's German is
that it is largely, though not entirely, free of his besetting faults of catachresis and neologism. See infra notes 165 & 185. However, Llewellyn's posthumously published German
book RECHT, RECHTSLEBEN uND GEsELLscH

T, seems to suffer from that numbing hyper-

abstractness characteristic of much high-academic German prose.
The author's reaction to Llewellyn's English is apparently shared by some German
readers. While recognizing that Llewellyn was a published poet and citing Max Rheinstein's appreciation of Llewellyn as "an artist in his inmost being" (im innersten Grunde
Ki2nstler), Manfred Rehbinder, the Swiss Llewellyn scholar who edited and oversaw the
posthumous publication of REcHT, RECHTSLEBzN uND GESELLSCHMT, went on to say that

"[u]nfortunately, even in his works on legal sociology, he often abandons his footing in
sober scholarly diction and lets himself get caught up in the flow of language and glides
into poetry." Rehbinder, supra note 1, at 535. Similarly, Rehbinder approvingly cites
another German scholar's reproach to Llewellyn for "[having] clothed his ideas in an
impressionistic form that leaves a great deal unclear." Id. at 553 n.15 (quoting criticism
of legal sociologist Nicholas Timasheff).
" The bank's in-house law department would shortly be absorbed by the law firm of
Shearman & Sterling.
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great internal debate on curricular reform. In this debate Llewellyn joined with Columbia's other Realists avant le nom, Underhill Moore, Herman Oliphant, Hessel Yntema and William 0.
Douglas, in seeking to reorganize the law school's courses along
functional lines."' But Llewellyn was not entirely of one mind
with them: he did not share the simultaneous enthusiasm of Oliphant, Moore and Yntema for turning the law school into a
graduate research institute in law and the social sciences, at any
rate not to the detriment of its traditional mission of profes1
sional training. 7
In 1927, at about the same time as he was busily organizing
a petition drive by American law professors on behalf of Italian
anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti,1 8 Llewellyn met the distinguished
German jurist Hermann Kantorowicz, 0 who lectured at Columbia that summer. It was most likely Kantorowicz, a member of
the law faculty at Freiburg, who arranged for Llewellyn to be
invited to visit at the University of Leipzig for a semester. 0
Llewellyn accepted. Quite apart from the obvious appeal of a return to Germany and the intellectual stimulation promised by
Leipzig, seat of the Reichsgericht and home to a distinguished
law faculty, the tense atmosphere engendered by the "deanship
crisis" at Columbia21 and the collapse of his first marriage

16 See generally TWINMNG, supra note 1, at 46-51 (discussing the study of curricular
reform undertaken at Columbia); LAURA KALmAN. LEGAL REALism AT YALE 1927-1980 7174 (1986) (same).
11TWINING,

supra note 1, at 103-04.
18 See Natalie E. H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence:A

Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Legal Realism, 1989 DuKx LJ. 1302,
1321-22 [hereinafter Prequell.
19 Hermann Kantorowicz (1877-1940), legal historian and key adherent of the "Free
Law" movement, was Professor of Law at the University of Freiburg and subsequently at
the University of KieL After the Nazis stripped him of his post in 1933, he taught in the
United States and England. His article Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALM L.
1240 (1934), was his contribution to the aftermath of the Llewellyn-Pound debate. For
details of Kantorowicz's role as a leading Freirechtler,see James E. Herget & Stephen
Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism,
73 Va. 11 REV. 399, 412-15, 446-47, 450-51 (1987).
20 Samuel Klaus, Karl Llewellyn, Prdjudizienrechtund Rechtsprechung in Amerika, 43 YALE L. 516, 516-17 (1934) (book review).
21 The "deanship crisis" came to a head in the spring of 1928, shortly before Liewellyn left for Germany. It was precipitated when Nicholas Murray Butler, the autocratic
President of Columbia University, appointed Young B. Smith, a "moderate," as Dean of
Columbia Law School, passing over Herman Oliphant, the candidate of the Realists/
Scientists, who had been the prime mover behind the curricular reform study and whom
Butler had previously hinted he would appoint. TwiniNG, supra note 1, at 47. Many
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doubtless made a sojourn away from New York seem rather
attractive.2 2
Llewellyn's first visit to Leipzig, during the winter semester
of 1928-29, was supported by the Carnegie Foundation s and the
Social Science Research Council.2 Llewellyn would later describe himself as having had two basic "jobs" on this first trip:
"1) To develop into coherent form a book on Law and the Social
Sciences. This was the main job. .

.

. 2) To teach a one-session-

a-week course on American case law."' 25 For reasons which will

faculty members were outraged that Butler had failed to consult with them on his selection of a Dean. The crisis culminated in the resignation, en masse, of Oliphant, Moore,
Yntema, Douglas and Marshall. See id. at 52-54 (discussing deanship crisis); KALMAN,
supra note 16, at 74 (same). Despite this exodus of most of his Realist colleagues, Llewellyn remained at Columbia where, together with Edwin Patterson, he was one of "the two
most outspoken realists on the faculty." KALAN, supra note 16, at 78. This decision to
stay behind, according to Grant Gilmore, may have soured Llewellyn's relations with
Underhill Moore. See TWINING, supra note 1, at 103-04 & n.77.
Ironically, Llewellyn afterwards indicated that he considered Young B. Smith to be
a realist. See CLSA, supra note 3, at 93 n.2 (giving a list of judges and legal scholars
Llewellyn regarded as modem in their thinking and/or engaged in research into "legal
facts"). Smith, however, does not figure among the realists listed by Llewellyn in the two
famous articles he wrote in his debate with Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound, A
Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 454 n.22 (1930) [hereinafter Next Step], reprinted in KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY
AND PRACTCE 3 (1962) and Some Realism about Realism, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1226
n.18 (1931) [hereinafter Some Realism], reprinted in KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 42 (1962). In the latter article, Llewellyn does include
Smith in the ambiguous category of "some others," scholars in addition to the 20 explicitly labeled Realists against whose works Llewellyn attempted to test Dean Pound's assertions about characteristic features of Realist scholarship.
For an interesting study of Llewellyn's changing roll call of realists, see Natalie E.H.
Hull, Some Realism about the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Realism: The Newly
Uncovered Private Correspondence,1927-1931, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 921 [hereinafter Llewellyn-PoundExchange]. Professor Hull's research indicates that Smith figured on a preliminary list of Realists Llewellyn proposed to Pound in a letter dated April 6, 1931
where he is included in a category Llewellyn defined as "realists who are thorough-going,
but probably less extreme in their positions," a category in which, incidentally, he in that
letter also included himself. Id. at 967-68. But see Some Realism, supra, at 1226 n.18
(Llewellyn describing himself as "both vociferous and extreme").
22 Rehbinder, Editor's Introduction, supra note 11, at 11. Llewellyn and his first
wife were finally divorced in 1930. Id.
" CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxiii. Llewellyn refers to himself as a "Carnegie International Professor."
24 See Letter from Karl Llewellyn to Walter R. Sharp, Secretary of the Social Science Research Council Committee on Grants-in-Aid (Mar. 7, 1930) (Karl Llewellyn Papers, University of Chicago) [hereinafter Sharp Letter] (explaining failure to complete
projected research project during Leipzig visitorship).
25

Id.
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be discussed below,26 his first job, the book on law and the social
sciences, was not completed on this visit. Ironically, it was his
second job-his teaching-that first led to publication of a book.
The course Llewellyn taught in Leipzig was designed to be
an introduction to the American legal system, with particular attention given to the role of case law. The chosen emphasis was
provocatively apt for German law students, given the strongly
deprecating attitude then taken by orthodox Civilians toward judicial decisions as sources of law. A second notable feature of the
course was that Llewellyn was not to teach it in the standard
Continental lecture format, but rather as a Praktikum, a discussion class devoted to the study of particular cases and actual
court opinions, which would serve as a basis for firsthand observation of the methodology of Common Law.
The choice of the Praktikum format, however, turned up a
major problem. As Llewellyn described it several years later:
[When I taught in Leipzig in 1928-29], it became clear to me that,
even though English common law had received occasional discussion
in German, and had at times been cited to illustrate the basic nature
of adjudication, the American variety had scarcely been dealt with at
all. And even with the English variety, German lawyers had never
been given enough original materials to form a clear picture of what
their common law counterparts were talking about, and certainly not
enough to make up their own minds when common lawyers were divided in their opinions 2 7

To remedy this situation, Llewellyn either translated or had

translated into German a number of English-language opinions
for use in his course.2 8 These translated cases formed the nu2 See infra text accompanying
217CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxii

note 232.

I At first sight, the statement in the text might appear to be cast in doubt by

CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxvii, which indicates that the "cases-and-materials" portion of
Pnt~uozmNREcHT was not completed until the spring of 1931, well after Llewellyn's first
visitorship at Leipzig ended. This doubt is strengthened by the identification, on the title
page of PR UmIzmmcHT, of Llewellyn's chief case translator, Wolfram v. Metzler, as an
apprentice lawyer [Referendar] in Berlin. It seems far likelier that Metzler was a law
student whom Llewellyn met at Leipzig in 1928-29 and then commissioned to translate
various cases into German, rather than someone the Leipzig faculty recommended longdistance to Llewellyn in New York preparing for his first visit to Leipzig. Furthermore,
the period from the summer of 1927 through the winter of 1928 seems too short a time
for the 60 odd cases (plus assorted supplementary materials) published as the second
part of THE CASE LAw SysTmi AmmUCA to have been translated, revised and printed
up for use by Llewellyn's students. Even so, Llewellyn's description of the course as a
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cleus of the German book eventually published as
Prd-judizienrecht.These cases were supplemented by secondary
materials written by Llewellyn and others, and by additional
translated opinions not used in the course."
Apart from his teaching, which later resulted in the publication of Prijudizienrecht,Llewellyn's first sojourn in Leipzig was
of major significance to his scholarly development for another
reason. It was during his time in Leipzig that he steeped himself
in the writings of the German sociologists Max Weber and Eugen Ehrlich, thinkers who would occupy a central place in Llewellyn's intellectual firmament and whose names and ideas would
frequently crop up throughout his subsequent writings.30
C. The Publication of Prijudizienrecht
In Llewellyn's papers is a contract dated February 20, 1930
between Llewellyn and the Leipzig Faculty of Law.31 In it the
faculty agreed to support the publication of Priijudizienrecht
with a subvention to the publisher, 32 in return for which LlewelPraktikum clearly implies that cases were used. The most plausible conjecture is that
the Leipzig class read the cases Llewellyn is identified as having translated himself. In
any case, the laconic notation "work concluded: Spring 1931" really does not say any
more than that Llewellyn put the finishing touches on that portion of the book at that
time.
19 See supra note 28.
30 Rehbinder, Editor's Introduction,supra note 11, at 12. In the Llewellyn papers
for this period is an invoice from a German bookseller relating to the purchase of
Weber's works. It is not clear when Llewellyn first read Weber or Ehrlich. Llewellyn
credited the Leipzig-born Harvard political scientist Carl Joachim Friedrich, who had
emigrated to the United States in 1922, with having "led [him], decades back, to Max
Weber." Karl Llewellyn, American Common Law Tradition and American Democracy, 1
J. LEG. & POL. Soc. 14, 15 (1942), reprinted in KARL LLEYWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALilst
IN THEORY AND PRACTCE 282, 283 (1962). What is likely is that he was "introduced" by
Friedrich to Weber in the United States, but used his time in Leipzig to deepen the
acquaintance. Twining reports that Llewellyn devoted some time around 1935 to attempting a translation of Weber. TwINING, supra note 1, at 418 n.90.
31This document, although signed by Llewellyn and H. Siber, Dean of the Leipzig
law faculty, was not the final contract agreement on the book. In a subsequent letter
dated May 18, 1930 Siber tells Llewellyn not to execute the February 20 draft because
certain changes had had to be made, most notably a decision to publish the bulky Part II
(the translated cases and materials and Llewellyn's case notes) in a separate volume. But
since the May 18 letter identifies the specific provisions to be changed, it is a fairly safe
assumption that other provisions of the contract remained unchanged in the final
document.
'2 The subvention was for an amount of 4000 Reichmarks. See Rehbinder, supra
note 11, at 9.

1992]

THE GERMAN LLEWELLYN

lyn assigned all rights in the work to the Leipzig faculty.33 The
latter also undertook to enter into a follow-up agreement with a
Leipzig publishing concern, Theodor Weicher Verlag.-" In its
agreement with Weicher, the faculty presumably assigned its
rights in the work to the publisher since the second page of the
book bears Weicher's notice of copyright.3 5 The book did not appear in print until 1933.
Prjudizienrecht was issued at about the same time as
Hitler was named German Chancellor. Despite the inauspicious

hour of its birth, the book received a number of favorable notices in German law reviews.3 6
No English-language version of Prdjudizienrechtwas ever
published during Llewellyn's lifetime.3 7 Even so, Llewellyn's cor-

This is the apparent construction to be placed on sections 1 and 2 of the contract:
§.1 The Faculty of Law undertakes the publication of the work written by Professor K.N. Llewellyn "Introduction to the American Precedent System." It
will enter into a publication contract in its own name, preserving the interests
of the author, with Theodor Weicher Verlag, Leipzig, and will make more specific arrangements therein relating to typeface, format, number of copies, retail
price and delivery of author's copies. Professor K.N. Llewellyn agrees to make
no other use, including any partial use, of his work.
§.2 The expenses of printing will be borne by the Faculty.
LIewellyn Papers, University of Chicago.
This publishing company no longer exists, having permanently disappeared from
the relevant book listings some time during World War IL This is doubtlIEs not unconnected to the fact that "Weicher" is a Jewish surname.
The copyright was registered in the United States on January 9, 1933, but was
never renewed or assigned. Ex rel. Paul Gewirtz, Professor of Law, Yale University.
31 "German jurisprudence is very much in the esteemed author's debt for considerably expanding its horizons in this work, the finest product of contemporary American
scholarship." H. Wflstend6rfer [Professor of Law, U. of Hamburg), Book Review, 7 ZErrscHRiur FOR AusLXNDiscH-s uND INTmNATioNALS PruVATRhcHT 739, 742 (1933). H. v.
Mangoldt [Lecturer in Law, Univ. of K6nigsberg], Book Review, 27 Ancaiv Fft Rcir
UND WissFscHAFrsPumosoPHm 304, 305 (1934):

The author has really been splendidly successful in bringing the features of
this American system of precedent closer to German lawyers. ...I regard the
first part of this book, in which the author gives a connected, extremely interesting presentation of the American case law system, as that to which German
readers will pay greatest attention.
37The author's translation of Books One and Two, or Part One of the entire work,
was published in 1989. See supranote 3. Professor John Dawson of Harvard Law School
had translated ten sections of Book Two, which were privately printed in 1951 for use in
a law school course he taught.
As far as can be ascertained, Llewellyn wrote the original text of PRXumDmMMcErr

in German. This conclusion is buttressed by several considerations. First, Llewellyn was
basically fluent in German. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text. Second, the
Llewellyn papers at the University of Chicago contain no trace of an English original of
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respondence indicates that he mounted an extensive campaign
to have the work reviewed in American and English law reviews
and social-science periodicals.3 8 One of the work's American reviewers was Lon Fuller. Fuller wrote both a short review of the
book 39 and then used it as the focus of his well-known article
American

Legal

Realism,40

in

which

he

opined

that

Prdjudizienrechtwas "the nearest approach" to "a comprehensive work which will both describe and apply the methods of legal realism, which can serve both as an
exposition of the ap''4 1
proach and as an exemplification of it.

Max Rheinstein, one of Llewellyn's colleagues on the faculty
of the University of Chicago-where Llewellyn taught after leaving Columbia in 1951-reported that Llewellyn was hoping to
put out a new German edition of Prjudizienrechtin connection
with his projected return to Germany in 1962-63, after his retirement from the University of Chicago. 42 He died before the plan
could be realized. Contemporary
German lawyers appear to
43
make little use of the book.
the text, only a few scattered English-language notes outlining the work's subject matter.
Third, in his introduction to the book, Llewellyn thanks two people for their "painstaking linguistic working-over" [sorgfaltige sprachliche Durcharbeitung] of the text, a
phrasing that suggests the editing of a text already written in German rather than a
translation into German of an English original [(Jbersetzung]. PRXJUDIZ1ENRECHT, supra
note 3, at viii. In that same introduction, Llewellyn speaks of "translation" exclusively in
the context of the cases and materials, Book 3, but never in the context of those portions
of the book he himself wrote. Finally and most importantly, in a handwritten note on a
1939 letter sent to Llewellyn to inquire whether an English translation of
PRXJUDIZMNRCHT existed, Llewellyn wrote: "No. But much of the point of view of some
of the theory is developed in June '38 - Nov '38 Yale L.J. And more in Mar. - April '39
Harv. L. Rev. Sorry - KNL." This letter is in the Llewellyn papers. (The articles to
which Llewellyn is referring are respectively: The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243 (1938); On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance,
Part I, 48 YALE L.J. 1 (1938) and Part II, 48 YAx L.J. 779 (1939); Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV.L. REv.725 (1939); and The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L.
REv. 873 (1939). It is difficult to believe that if an English text existed, Llewellyn would
not have sought to have it published, particularly in light of how anxious he was for the
book to be reviewed by American and English law reviews and social science periodicals.
See infra note 38.
The Llewellyn Papers contain copies of letters by Llewellyn to numerous law reviews and social-science periodicals requesting that the book be reviewed.
:' Fuller, supra note 14, at 551.
40Lon Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1934).
4' Id. at 430.

Rheinstein, supra note 1, at 604.
43 Ex rel. Matthias Reimann, Professor of Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
One possible reason for this may be the improvement in German lawyers' English ]an42
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D. Leipzig II: 1931-32
The period after his return from Germany in 1929 was one
of enormous activity and scholarly productivity for Llewellyn."
For the next several years he continued to work sporadically on
the Sacco and Vanzetti case.4 5 In 1929 and 1930 he first delivered the set of lectures to Columbia law students that would become Bramble Bush. In 1930, a year that saw a divorce from
his first wife finalized,47 Llewellyn also published his groundbreaking, thousand-page Cases and Materials on the Law of
Sales.4s Furthermore, in that annus mirabilis 1930, there was a
major engagement with the work of another key Realist thinker:

Llewellyn read and participated in a symposium 0 on Jerome

guage skills since Llewellyn's day, such that original materials, by which Llewellyn set
such great store, are now accessible to a far greater number of Germany lawyers. The
contents of Prijudizienrechtwill be discussed in Part IL
" To the works mentioned in the main text might be added Llewellyn's fantasmagorical What Price Contract?-AnEssay in Perspective, 31 COLUI. L. Rav. 704 (1931),
which grew out of a commission he received to write the "Contracts" article for the E_1CYCLOPEDUIA OF THE SoCIAL ScmNscas. The editor of the Encyclopedia was unsatisfied
enough with Llewellyn's essay, which he charitably dubbed "impressionistic"-wildly undisciplined would be nearer the mark-that he sought to enlist Ro-e Pound's help in
getting the article into a shape more suitable for an encyclopedia. See Prequel, supra
note 18, at 1327-33. The failure of the Llewellyn-Pound collaboration on the "Contracts"
article has been highlighted by Professor Hull as one of the significant factors in the
background of the Lewellyn-Pound debate. Id.
41Prequel, supra note 18, at 1324 & n.109; TwnmG, supra note 1, at 346.
46

KARL LLEwELLYN, BRanMn

BUSH vii (Oceana Pub. 1960) (1930) [hereinafter

BAmmLE BusH].
'7 Rehbinder, Editor'sIntroduction,supra note 11, at 11.
48 KARL LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERULS ON THE LAw OF SATS (1930) [hereinafter
SALEs CASEBooK]. Twining describes it as "a work of profound scholarship and original-

ity ... generally recognized as a landmark in the history of the American casebook."
TWUNG, supra note 1, at 131. Kalman, while noting the book's "strong impact" and
"striking features," notes that, in at least one respect, it failed to deliver on one of Lewellyn's (and Realism's) promises:
In retrospect, it appears that candor was the major difference between the realists' and the traditionalists' approach to the social sciences during the 1930's.
The conceptualists did not pretend that they were integrating law with the
social sciences; the realists did. Although Llewellyn indicated in the introduction to Casesand Materialson the Law of Sales that he had drawn on modem
psychology, experimental logic, social psychology, anthropology, and sociology,
most of his annotations discussed business practices without using material
from any of the social sciences to explain their significance.
KALmsN, supra note 16, at 79, 92.
"' The symposium, in which the othei participants were Mortimer Adler and Walter
Wheeler Cook, appears in the Columbia Law Review. Legal Certainty,31 CoLu,. L. REy.
82-115 (1932).
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Frank's controversial Law and the Modern Mind, a work that
influenced many a passage of PriljudizienrechtY'
Of equal moment for the history of modern American jurisprudence, 1930 also saw the appearance of Llewellyn's remarkable, characteristically undisciplined essay A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step,5 ' which provided the eponym for a
group of scholars who would become known as Legal Realists.
The article was also the opening salvo fired in Llewellyn's famous exchange with Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound, a
battle that echoes in the pages of Pr'ijudizienrecht52 and one
with baleful consequences for subsequent scholarship on
realism.

53

Llewellyn returned to Leipzig in 1931 and again took up his
work on legal sociology, lecturing 4 on it one hour a week to students from all disciplines."" In these lectures he sought to identify with greater precision than in his Next Step article "the
subject matter of a science of law"58 and to offer some "daring
hypotheses

' 57

about what this science might reveal about the in-

terrelationship between law and society.58 Apart from his weekly
lectures in Leipzig, Llewellyn delivered a number of successful
guest lectures at other German universities.5 9 He also formed reSee infra text accompanying note 103 & 254-56.
Next Step, supra note 21, at 431.
1 [There is a battle raging in the United States between the purely deductive
theory and the position espoused here, which, it seems to me, is truer to life. I
am in the middle of this battle and can free myself from it only with difficulty.
:.. [E]ven when writing in a foreign language, [a foreigner] may remain stuck
in the quarrels of his homeland; for that, however, he craves indulgence, and
especially understanding.
CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxvii.
"SFor the details of the Llewellyn-Pound debate, see infra text accompanying notes
231-48.
" Llewellyn describes the origin of the book as a Kolleg [course of lectures] as opposed to a Praktikum. RRG, supra note 3, at 19.
Rehbinder, Editor'sIntroduction, supra note 11, at 9.
Sharp Letter, supra note 24, at 1.
RRG, supra note 3, at 20.
Even when lecturing in German, of course, Llewellyn remained Llewellyn: not
content with neologism in English, he coined two words in German, Trecht and Handle,
reportedly being disappointed when the former did not catch on. Rehbinder, Editor's
Introduction, supra note 11, at 8. Rehbinder does not mention the reception given to
Handle, but it is hard to imagine it was any more favorable. On the meaning of these
coinages, see infra notes 176 & 199.
59 The universities at which he delivered these guest lectures included Frankfurt,
Heidelberg, Bonn, Freiburg, Berlin, Breslau, Kiel and Jena. Frankfurt even offered him a
80

51
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lationships with a number of German legal scholars that endured long past his stay in Germany. 0
On this second trip Llewellyn remained in Leipzig at least
until early August 1932 when he wrote the preface to
Prajudizienrecht,then in the final stages of preparation for
publication."' Hence he was presumably in Germany to witness
the crucial elections of July 31, 1932 when the Nazis won 13.7
million votes and 230 seats in the Reichstag, thereby becoming
the largest political party and paving the way for2 Hitler's appointment as Chancellor early the following year.
E. The Publicationof Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft
Llewellyn sought to have his 1931-32 Leipzig lectures on legal sociology, together with some additional materials, published
in Germany under the title Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft. Llewellyn's contemporaneous notation on the typescript
describes the work as "publikationsreif [ready for publica-

position on its faculty. Rehbinder, Editor'sIntroduction, supra note 11, at 12. One of
Rebbinder's informants, Ernst E. Hirsch, recalled the "lively impression" Llewellyn had
made during a guest lecture in Frankfurt in 1931.Id. at 8. At a program of the Comparative Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools' Conference on January 6,
1987 Professor Stefan Riesenfeld of the University of California-Berkeley spoke of his
own encounter with Llewellyn from this period.
The great commercial lawyer and comparativist Ernst Rabel invited Llewellyn to
Berlin and obtained his agreement to be an adviser to the International Institute for the
Unification of Law ("UNIDROIT") on its project of unifying international sales law.
Rehbinder, supra note 11, at 12. Llewellyn attended a meeting connected to the project
in Rome in 1932, which he found "interesting. laborious. unpractical." TVMING, supra
note 1, at 108. Before this project could ever reach completion, Llewellyn became involved with the effort to unify American domestic sales law, resulting in article tw~o of
the Uniform Commercial Code. The international project, interrupted by World War H,
only reached fruition in 1980 with the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, also known as the Vienna Convention, which became law in
the United States on January 1,1988. U.N. Doc. A/CoNw. 97/18/Annex 1 (1980) reprinted
in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987) (U.N. certified English text).
Other scholars whom Llewellyn met or with whom he deepened his acquaintance
during this period included Nussbaum, Kantorowicz, Koschaker, Jahrreis, Mitteis, the
criminologist Exner and the sociologist Freyer. Rehbinder, Editor'sIntroduction,supra
note 11, at 12. Among the most affecting items I encountered in the Llewellyn papers
was a series of letters from Arthur Nussbaum, a German Jew, written after Hitler came
to power, seeking Llewellyn's help in getting out of Germany. He first escaped to Holland and later, with Llewellyn's help, obtained a position on the Columbia faculty.
61 CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxvii.
See ARY FULBROOK. A CONCISE HISTORYor GmmO
A 176 (1990).
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tion]."6 But the economic situation of German academic publishers was so perilous that the manuscript could not be published without a substantial subvention. The Leipzig law faculty,
having previously contributed 4000 marks toward the publication of Prajudizienrecht,was no longer in a position to provide
an additional grant. Thus, a number of academic presses turned
the manuscript down. After failing to have it published in 1932,
Llewellyn appears simply to have laid the manuscript aside. It
remained unpublished until 1977, fifteen years after Llewellyn's
death, by which time its existence had come to the attention of
the Swiss legal sociologist Manfred Rehbinder 6 4 It has not yet
been translated into English.
Upon his retirement from the University of Chicago in 1962,
Llewellyn was planning to return to Germany to lecture on law
and sociology in Freiburg and Hamburg. He intended to return
to his project of thirty years earlier: to draft a systematic sociology of law. Before he could make that trip, he died on February
13, 1962.65
II.

THE

JURISPRUDENCE

OF

THE

Germanica: AN

OUTLINE

Eppur' si muove
Six common concerns animate the intellectual world of
Prdjudizienrechtand Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft. The
first is a factual question: What is it that judges do? Is it correct
to describe it as rule-following? If not, what do judges do? The
second question is also factual: Is the operation of the judicial
system still predictable if it turns out that judges do not simply
follow rules? If they do not simply follow rules, what accounts
for that predictability? The third question is technical: How,
mechanically, can judges achieve legal change at all given the
ideology and systemic constraints of the institution within which
they operate? The fourth question is interpretive: Why is it slow
change that is being achieved by the judicial system? The fifth
question is normative: What should judges be doing? What is
the charge to courts? The final question is sociological and it is a
'3 Rehbinder, Editor'sIntroduction, supra note 11, at 9.

" For the circumstances of Rehbinder's involvement with the manuscript, see id. at
8-9.

6, Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft will be discussed in conjunction with

Priijudizienrechtin Part H1.
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preoccupation that underlies all the others: What is the nature
of law's interaction with society, their reciprocal influences and
effects?
A. Prijudizienrecht: The Two Faces of Law
The book that emerged from the 1928-29 visit to Leipzig,
Prtjudizienrechtund Rechtsprechung in Amerika, represents a
compilation and expansion of the materials Llewellyn had devel6 6 The work begins with a modest sugoped for his Praktikum.
gestion that it is something in the nature of a legal process
casebook, filling in a lacuna in the German literature on the
Common Law. 7 But there is much more to it than that.
Prdjudizienrechtis quite obviously also conceived, in part, as an
exercise in comparative lawMuch of what follows will be of immediate use to German lawyers
only insofar as the contrasts between German and American law make

them more sharply aware of the fundamental character of their own
legal system. By seeing how another relatively advanced culture can
make entirely different arrangements for things they have always supposed to be matters of course-things that obviously must be this way
and not the other-they also may gain a critical outlook and an ex-

panded capacity for adapting their own system's traditional institutions to the practical needs of real life as they evolve. On the other

hand, much in this book addresses problems that are virtually identical in both systems. Recognizing and solving a problem becomes remarkably easier when it shows up wearing a peculiar foreign
costume."

Throughout the work, in fact, two recurrent themes are played
off against each other in a comparativist counterpoint: Llewellyn's proselytizing of Civilians on the merits of case law and his
how much they have to
badgering of Common Lawyers over
69
learn from Civilians about statutes.
Underlying Llewellyn's first claim, that precedent had
something to offer Civilians, was his airing of the precedent sysSee supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
e' See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
CLSA, supra note 3, at 1.
See, e.g., id. § 62, at 73. Llewellyn was naturally arguing neither for case law as a
replacement for codification, nor vice-versa, but only for the merits of each methodoloay
as embodying a set of supplementary techniques extremely beneficial to the sound development of legal systems that were each increasingly becoming mixed in character.
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tem's strengths and weaknesses, particularly in its American incarnation. Were the Germans ever to be persuaded of the value,
indeed the "inevitability," 70 of case law, which he noted was on
the rise in German law, despite the best efforts of legal scholars
to ignore it or fend it off,7 1 it was equally his hope that they
would be put on their guard against the shortcomings and de72
fects that had marred it in the United States.
Llewellyn's critique of case law is unsparing. It is matched,
however, by an equally vigorous defense of precedent against attacks he thought unjustified, from quarters both foreign and domestic. 7 3' The primary source of these attacks lay in a fundamental misunderstanding of the system, rooted in the
misinformation put out by some of its own adherents, in particular by the advocates of Doktrin and Dogmatik, that is, by orthodox legal theorists of a black-letter or Langdellian stripe. To
counter this and to present a true picture of precedent, Llewellyn proposed to take a page from the social sciences and adopt
"a
fundamentally
sociological
approach
[soziologische
7
4
Grundeinstellung]," proceeding in the manner of an "anthropologist, ' 17 whose job is "scientific observation [wissenschaftlich
Beobachtend],' 7 6 description of what has been observed and reproduction of the raw data studied. It is from Llewellyn's rejoinder to the standard American legal theory of his day that the
book derives much of its jurisprudential interest and most of its
polemical animus.
'7 7
Priijudizienrechtis divided into three "Books.
1.

Book One

Book One, comprising thirty-nine numbered sections, seeks
to provide German readers with the basic knowledge necessary
to read and understand American (and, to a lesser extent, English) case law. The bulk of Book One consists of bread-andId. § 40, at 48-49.
" Id. § 40, at 48-50.
7' Llewellyn's catalogue of shortcomings can be found in CLSA. Id. § 40, at 47 n.2.
71 See id. § 73.
74 Id. § 63, at 90.
70

7

Id. § 74, at 113; cf. id. at xxxv ("an anthropological presentation").

71 Id. at xxxv.
77 PRXJUDIZIENRECHT was

apparently sold in two separate parts, Part One (consisting

of Books One and Two) and Part Two (consisting of Book Three).
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butter information about the American court system, the process of "finding the law," basic civil procedure and the law-equity distinction.75 Llewellyn starts out with a brief discussion of
the significance of judge-made (as opposed to codified) law and
follows this with a succinct account of the history of Common
Law, its ideology and characteristic features. He presents a fairly
orthodox presentation of how to read cases and determine what
rules of law they stand for, and notes the way these rules are
regarded as governing the disposition of subsequent cases.
Anticipating his fuller treatment in Book Two, however,
Llewellyn then proceeds to undermine this orthodoxy by sharply
circumscribing the real value of verbal formulations of legal
rules. First, he notes that the common law rules' very "malleability"78 i.e., their typical lack of a fixed phrasing, allows for
their unnoticed refashioning. Furthermore, if one does not assume major technical incompetence by the trial bar and judiciary infailing to ascertain an existing correct rule, the very phenomenon of successful appeals indicates that "rules" provide no
certain guide to case outcomes. Indeed, virtually all cases on appeal to courts of last resort are legally ambivalent, "doubtful"
cases that "could be decided just as easily, legally speaking, for
the plaintiff as for the defendant." 80 Finally, Llewellyn even
evinces a certain agnosticism about the part, if any, that rules
actually play in the decision-making process. In the individual
case, the "legally incalculable" human factor, the judge's personality, may be dispositive8 1 Over the run of cases, social and economic forces may be at work.
2. The Cases and Materials (Book Three)
While Book Two constitutes Llewellyn's "comprehensive
79 Book One is presumably based on, if not identical to, a 51-page pamphlet Lewellyn apparently gave his Leipzig students in 1928-29. See Wimwu Twnumc, THE KmL
LLwxLmYN PAPERS 48 (1968) (giving as item number 17 in the bibliography of Llewellyn's published works: "Einfhrungin das amerikanischePrijudizienrechtwesen[Introduction to the American Precedent System] (for use at Leipzig University), Altenburg, Thiringen, Oskar Bonde (1928), 51 pp."). Book One is approximately the same
size, taking up 46 pages in PRrUnxnzmmmcHTc. Furthermore, at the end of his Preface to
the latter, Llewellyn indicates that Book One was completed in 1928. CLSA, supra note
3, at xxxvii
79 Id.-§ 4, at 3.
Id. § 8,at 8.
81 Id. § 8b, at 11.
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discussion" of the case-law system,8 2 the discussion to some extent presupposes a prior acquaintance with Book Three, the
translated cases and materials. Llewellyn apparently expected

his German readers (or at least his ideal German readers) to familiarize themselves with Book Three before going on to read

Book Two.

3

The "anthropological" 8 4 material in the former, he

believed, would either bear out or refute his portrait of case law
in the latter.

Llewellyn's goal in selecting Book Three's cases was not to
give German readers a representative overview of American substantive law.8 5 Rather, his purpose was "to show how the doctrine of precedent actually works, and to provide an insight into

the nature of case law adjudication, in fact into judicial decision-

making more generally." 8 The cases were accordingly meant to
illustrate the realist thesis that "the law is caught up in change,
and much more so than is commonly supposed. 8' 7 Some cases
would show change effected through the "Janus-faced" case

Id. § 40, at 47.
8' See Llewellyn's "rallying cry" at the end of Book One, "ON To THE CONCRETE
MATERIALS! [HERAN AN DEN KONKRETEN STOFF!]," CLSA, supra note 3, § 39, at 46, and
PRXJUDIZIENRECHT, supra note 3, at 46; and his language at the very beginning of Book
Two: "Now that readers have before them a number of specific decisions I can refer to
and now that they can test and check my assertions against them .... .", CLSA, supra
note 3, § 40, at 47; see id. § 40, at 48 n.2. ("The conclusions drawn really need to flow
from Part Irs cases and materials themselves once one has seriously set about working
through them.").
The published translation does not reproduce these cases, but provides a list of the
cases referenced, together with citations, for American readers interested in pursuing
them further. See infra text accompanying notes 91-97 (discussing Llewellyn's selection
of cases). Llewellyn obviously thought that Books One and Two were capable of standing
on their own, inasmuch as he acceded to their publication separate from, and in greater
quantities than, Book Three (the cases and materials).
", With regard to the "anthropological" character of the work, Llewellyn had stated
in the Introduction:
As befits an anthropological presentation . . . I hope that the [cases and]
materials themselves will enable the reader to make independent criticisms of
my conclusions, and, where needed, even refute me with my own evidence. For
the primary aim of this work is to observe, and to describe what it observes; it
seeks to present American case law at the appellate-court level as it is, the
dispiriting along with the inspiring.
CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxv. Significantly, Llewellyn's first citation in Book 2 is to
AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926). CLSA, supra
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CmI
note 3, § 40, at 47 n.2.
82

88 Id. at 1.

8 Id. at xxxiii (original emphasis omitted).
87

Id. at xxxiv.
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method, " " that is,
[t]he accepted way unwelcome precedents are confined (distinguish-

ing), and the equally accepted way welcome precedents are expanded
(stating the rule of a case broadly, glossing over the origins of a particular rule in a passage of dictum, etc.). That the work method of our
judges has harbored this dichotomy, we have long known. But it has
not, I think, heretofore been claimed a) that each half of this dichotomy is just as correct, in legal doctrine, as the other; and b) that a
case-law system finds its true essence and sustenance precisely in this

"alternative" doctrine.89

Changes in legal substance, however, could often be found even
in cases where the language of the opinion led readers to suppose that no change was taking place, that nothing more was
happening than a common or garden application of some existing rule:
Insofar as change and growth are so immediately obvious in so many
of the cases presented, my selection may actually give a somewhat
distortedpicture of normal American decisionmaking.... [To avoid
having the selection needlessly distorted, I have also taken pains to
put in a fair number of cases in which the court kept to its "old
ways." I have, I grant, tried to show that even in such cases the court's
decision was in fact breaking new ground, that only in form did precedent seem to dictate the decision. 0

Like the good social scientist he was here aspiring to be,
Llewellyn was not insensitive to the problem of evidentiary distortion inherent in choosing only corroborating cases to illustrate any particular thesis, a methodological failing for which he
sternly took orthodox legal scholarship to task.9 To counteract
the problem, he chose only half the cases for Book Three. The
other half, previously unknown to him, were pulled together by
one William A. Leider, described as "a New York attorney," but
who apparently had been an editor of the Columbia Law Review
s Id. § 40, at 49 n.4.
Id. § 39, at 46 (omitting internal cross.references). Compare BRA'm' Busif,
supra note 46, at 74.
90 CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxiv-xxxv. Still Llewellyn thought that his principle of
selection for the cases-the fact that they "embody something of formal significance to

3ur case law system, or illustrate a recurrent topic (how statutes are treated) or a recur-

•ent process (how an outmoded rule gets preserved or expanded, whether to base a deal;ion on a broader legal 'institution' instead of a narrow legal rule, etc.)"--were "neutral
ir varied enough to come close to a 'natural' selection of cases." rd. at xxxv.
92 See id. § 63, at 90-91.
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working for Llewellyn as a research assistant, 2 "who had no idea
what I might ultimately want to say about them."9 3
Generally, the cases included in Book Three, as Llewellyn
describes them, are
more than fifty American decisions, unabridged or in the form of extended case synopses, which include a statement of the facts, the procedural posture of the question before the court, the reasoning of the
opinion and the holding. Seven English cases are given similar treatment.... Thirty [of the American decisions] have been taken from
the jurisprudence of New York State, seventeen of these from decisions of that State's highest appellate court over the last few years."

Not surprisingly, there is a certain overlap with the cases Llewellyn had included in his roughly contemporaneous Cases and
Materials on the Law of SalesY5 Indeed quite a number of the
cases deal with contract or commercial-law matters. Still, they

were included not because of their subject matter but because
they illustrated something characteristic of case-law adjudica-

tion and because Llewellyn was already familiar with them. Accompanying many of the cases are comments, long and
which Llewellyn provides a close reading and critique
portions of an opinion that bear on some key feature of
Furthermore, Book Three also contains some primarily

short, in
of those
case law.
informa-

tional introductions to a particular line of decisions,"' as well as
a number of excerpts from treatises, law review articles, and the
writings of various legal scholars, notably Cardozo (one of the
book's two dedicatees), Holmes and Pound. 7
92 See Karl Llewellyn, Jurisprudence Lecture, May 6, 1953, at 2 (Llewellyn Papers,
University of Chicago). I am grateful to Professor Natalie Hull of Rutgers-Camden for
drawing my attention to this lecture.
03 CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxv.

0 Id. at xxxiii. New York cases were emphasized in order "to show how a single
court in a single state invokes a variety of formal doctrines while in practice reaching the
same outcomes." Id.
SALES CASEBooK, supra note 48.
See, e.g., PRXJuDiziENR-CHT (Part 2), supra note 3, at 117-18 & 280-83 ("The substantive law of the seal" and "Bona fide purchase for value at Law"). Llewellyn used
materials appearing in his casebook on the law of sales, see SALES CASEBooK, supra note
48, at 340-43, as his introduction to a group of cases on consumer protection,
PRJuDizcErcHT (Part 2), supra note 3, at 156-62.
'1 There are also three appendices to the work. In Appendix I, "Frequency test ot
the day-to-day work of a number of appellate courts," PRXiUDzxsNRcwr (Part 2), supri
note 3, at 343-46, Llewellyn analyzes the work product of the appellate courts publishe
in volume 155 of the Northeastern Reporter, providing statistics on the number of revoi
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3. Book Two
Book Two consists of sections forty through seventy-four.
Llewellyn describes his project in this book as one of developing
first.., a picture of a specific, historically conditioned precedent sys-

tem, America's, with all its peculiarities, shortcomings and virtues-an anthropological undertaking. But, second, it is important to

reveal what general significance this anthropological material may
have, what bearing it has not only on how a case law system works
and what it holds important, but also on the nature of adjudication
more generally, indeed adjudication even in a system of written law,

in which the written word maintains that it alone rules over the whole
of law.98

a. Court Portrait
What was the usual "picture" of precedent in America
against which Llewellyn's anthropological picture would be
seen? The portrait generally painted in Llewellyn's day was of
an applied science at work. Since the beginning of the modem
age, many fields of learning had sought the prestige accruing to
mathematics and the hard sciences from the enviable solidity of
their results. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century the
legal system had evolved a "scientific" model of the way it operated, a logical "science of law" purporting to explain the judicial.
process on a "deductive" or "syllogistic" model."" This science
held that the outcome of every legal controversy could be determined by setting up a syllogism. Its major premise would be the
applicable preexisting "rule of law" that could be gleaned from
earlier cases; the minor premise was the facts of the controversy
at issue as analyzed under the fact categories employed by the
foregoing rule; and the logically required conclusion drawn
sals and affirmances, dissenting votes and opinions, and separate concurrences. In Appendix H, "On the Zeiler-Blomeyer-Gerland Precedent Bill," id. at 347-50, Llewellyn expresses a generally positive reaction to draft legislation that proposed to allow individual
panels of the German Supreme Court, whenever they so chose, to issue formally binding
rules of law in their particular areas of expertise. Finally, in Appendix HI, "Some recent
literature on the precedent system," id. at 351, Llewellyn included a short bibliography
of English-language materials. An English translation of Appendix II appears in CLSA,
supra note 3, at 115-18.
98 CLSA, supra note 3, § 40, at 47-48 (footnote omitted).
92 See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pmr. L. REv. 1
(1983).
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therefrom would supply the "correct" decision of the case. 10 0
Theoretically, such a "scientific" process ought to have been
reproducible, with identical results, by all adepts of legal sci-

ence, practicing attorneys and sitting judges alike. Thus, competent attorneys representing the interests of opposing parties
ought to have been able to spare their clients the time and expense of litigation by jointly running through the same exercise
in syllogistic reasoning themselves, thereby scientifically "predicting" the eventual outcome of any lawsuit. In fact, though
such a consequence was presumably not often aired, syllogistic
theory logically ought to have led to a kind of withering-away of
the judicial estate. 10 1 Nonetheless, where litigation did ensue because of lawyers' ineptitude, judges' written opinions served to
reconstruct the syllogistic reasoning for the dullards unable to
figure it out for themselves.
b.

The Warts Restored

Llewellyn spurns this mechanistic explanation of the judicial process for the truly new case. 102 The initial focus of his re100 Besides the allure of "scientific" status, another appeal of a rule-based theory of
adjudication was that it provided a mitigation, of sorts, of the questionable legitimacy
under democratic theory of a partly unelected and largely non-accountable judiciary. If
judges were bound to follow rules, they therefore were at least not wielding arbitrary
power, a minimum requisite for a state based on law. One could, with a bit of squinting,
see a kind of diachronic democracy at work in the way legal rules evolved over time, the
dialogue between modem judges and their predecessors carried on in the various lines of
cases, embracing the democratic process values of argument and persuasion and often
yielding as its rules a kind of majoritarian consensus, "the weight of authority."
101 The statement in the text is somewhat hyperbolic. Even under syllogistic theory,
there would still be a need for courts of first instance to exercise a fact-finding function
when disputants disagreed on what had happened. Still, the demotion is not inconsiderable: from lawgivers to detectives. Furthermore, for dim-witted attorneys recourse to the
judicial process would continue as before.
102 Llewellyn concedes that a deductive description of what actually takes place in
the decision-making process may well be appropriate for a class of controversies that he
appears to regard as numerically insignificant. those with facts that are truly "on all
fours" with those of a prior case in every significant respect. This class of cases is numerically insignificant because Llewellyn defines "on all fours" quite narrowly. To him, it
implies not just the same material facts but also the presence of an unchanged social
setting against the background of which the facts of each occurred. When such cases are
brought to court, Llewellyn is prepared to grant that deduction and syllogism are accurate accounts of the judicial process. Still, in such situations, the case is only brought to
court because of the incompetence of the attorneys in faling to recognize the truly "applicable" rule that covers and should have led to an out-of-court settlement of the dispute. See CLSA, supra note 3, § 42, at 56 n.11 & § 54, at 75.
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jection is on the deduction's minor premise, i.e., the statement
of the facts of a case analyzed under the categories used in the
rule of law (the major premise). In a strikingly Frankean passage, Llewellyn writes:
[A scholar] knows that it is impossible for anyone to have objective
knowledge of the facts as they really are. Out of one and the same
mass of facts, each of us, based on individual experience, decides what
"the" facts are. What one has learned to regard as important is what
one sees, what one most readily notes about a situation. This is what
one looks for. This is also what one has a tendency to emphasize, overlooking many other elements in themselves no less important. This is
true of anyone's observation of any fact situation. It is most certainly
true when it is a matter of classifying facts for the purposes of
description and further use. For lawyers in particular, such classifying
is a tacit precondition for handling any legal dispute. A lawyer has no
wish to deal with isolated facts, with the Unique. He wants to deal
with facts as instances of fact categories. Within the raw factual matter, he seeks out the few "essential" facts, those which are of legal
relevance because they fit into a legal fact category, thus providing a
handle for "applying" a legal rule. We know this, we accept this, and
call it good. But we are apt to slip into the belief that not only is there
generally just one possible way to classify the facts, but also that the
particularclassificationmade in a specific lawsuit has something necessary, something foreordained about it.L " 3

The intimation that "facts" are not susceptible to scientific
treatment is borne out by the Anglo-American phenomenon of
the separate opinion, a major key to Llewellyn's repudiation of
the deductive theory. Among their many virtues,110 dissents and
concurrences often spotlight the refractory complexity and factual richness lying just below the smooth apodictic surface of
many a majority opinion:
An observer will first note that the statements of facts in the separate
opinion and the main opinion do not precisely coincide; often they are
at loggerheads.... Without needing a separate opinion to prove it, a
scholar might already have suspected that the facts of the case undergo reshaping as the decision is being made, but especially as the
opinion is being written.
To the sociologist it is clear... that a fact situation admits of
103 Id. § 42, at 53. Cf. JERomE FRAN, LAW AND TnE MoDmw AND 114-15 & 144-45
(Coward-McCann, Inc. 1949) (1930).
10" See Fuller, supra note 14, at 551-52 (singling out Llewellyn's treatment of separate opinions for special praise).
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more than one of the constructions espoused; that each way of construing the facts will contain a degree of violence to either the fact
situation or the classifying category. For the facts will typically require the making of some "adjustments" to a category which, before
the court came to construe these facts, was not quite applicable to
them. There is a slight shifting of either the facts or the category, and
neither competing interpretation is "right" or "wrong." Rather, the
interpretation either does or does not further a particular purpose, the
interpreter tacitly choosing from among various possible purposes.
We know too that a raw fact situation cannot be classified without shunting the bulk of the facts off to one side.... [I]f, when studying cases, one generally gets to see only a single, officially presented
statement of the facts, if one takes this official statement as the basis
for one's knowledge and criticism of the case ... the "application" of
the legal rule will seem deceptively simple ....
But when one sees a

second judge at work, when at a significant point in his opinion facts
emerge that were completely glossed over in the majority's version, we
cannot avoid realizing that everything is not quite as simple as it
might first have seemed.105

Then Llewellyn joins battle with the regnant orthodoxy on a
second front. A further reason to mistrust the conventional portrait of case law is provided by a line of argument in Book
One"'8 to which he now returns: the critique of legal rules, the
major premises of judicial syllogisms. Earlier on, he had pointed
to slippery phraseology, to the phenomena of successful appeals
and "doubtful cases" and to our ignorance of the actual way
cases are decided, so as to undercut the sweeping claims traditionally made for rules in the judicial process. But now, calling
again on separate opinions, he notes that just as the ex ante ambivalence of most Supreme Court cases and the successful prosecution of appeals suggest the inadequacy of a purely rule-based
theory of adjudication, separate opinions only serve to confirm
that inadequacy, but synchronically, all on a single level of the
judicial hierarchy, rather than diachronically, up and down the
hierarchical ladder:
Where a dissent is written, the differing analyses would indeed lead to
differing outcomes. It is here that one realizes that, if decision making
1o*CLSA, supra note 3, § 42, at 52-54. In his second Leipzig book, Llewellyn complains that the lack of the institution of separate opinions in Continental European legal
systems makes it difficult to gauge the exact influence of legal rules. RRG, supra note 3,
at 60.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
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is viewed as a matter of pure deduction from preexisting, clearly defined rules of law, there is less to be said for the predictability of decisions than one might readily think. Yet even where the separate opinion is in the form of a concurrence, one inevitably reaches the same
conclusion. For if the same fact situation can be analyzed by learned
judges in a variety of ways, it is only a matter of chance that the analyses eventuate in the same result, if the legal analysis is really the
decisive factor in the decision.... On this view of things, the separate
concurrence assumes a level of significance beyond even a dissent's.
For here we can observe a majority of the panel, despite all their differences over the law, nonetheless reaching the same conclusion from
the same fact situation. 117
There now comes a final line of attack. While the collective
import of majority opinions, dissents and concurrences is to assert the simultaneous applicability of mutually exclusive rules of
law to one and the same fact situation-a claim scandalous, of
course, to a logical "science"-even where rules are unanimously

accepted as controlling, they are likely to be in some wise empirically defective:
Were one to make a special study of the way black-letter scholars
state legal rules... one would usually find that, even though this
process is based on empirical observation, it only selectively reflects
prior observation. However conscious or careful they are about doing
it, black-letter lawyers cull only a few cases from among the relevant
ones decided, plus a few of those discussed in the literature or hypothesized, perhaps first giving a few they thought up themselves.
Rarely will they even have all the relevant cases in front of them; and
should they have them all, they still regularlyomit a number. Indeed,
even when they do not have all the cases, they exclude many of the
cases looked at. What remains becomes the core, the framework of
their legal rule, or what they would maintain is its "correct" content..
.
hat they have done is somehow to forget both that their own
procedure for framing legal rules has its basis in description [of what
courts are doing], and that their rule has simplified what it meant to
describe.108

Because a precedent system is grounded in past court practice,
this descriptive inaccuracy of black-letter rules, the vice of
overgeneralization, necessarily skews the true normative force of

107

CLSA, supra note 3, § 42, at 55 (footnotes omitted).

'- Id. § 63, at 90-91. The magisterial division of the sheep from the goats described
by Llewellyn is standard practice in many a law school classroom even today. The former
are called into life eternal, the heaven of "correctly decided" cases; the latter, the
"wrongly decided," go away into everlasting oblivion.
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prior decisions."0 9 Not only might a sitting judge disagree with
fellow decisionmakers on which of several vying rules correctly
applied to the facts of a pending dispute, these precedential
competitors might also themselves be, to some extent, summary
misstatements of past facts and, hence, of the presently controlling rule of law.
c. Back to the Appearances
What would a true picture of precedent look like? Because
he views his project as, in the first instance, one of "anthropological" portraiture, Llewellyn starts out by urging extreme diffidence in the vocal behavior of judges, i.e., in the language of
opinions. Citing Bronislaw Malinowski's recently published
Crime and Custom in Savage Society,110 Llewellyn commends to
lawyers the increasing skepticism of ethnographers of "primitive" cultures, who had gone from credulous acceptance of the
natives' own explanations [herrschendeIdeologie] of what they
were doing, to a disregard of these explanations altogether, and,
finally, to an inclusion of these explanations as one element of
their interpretations of "native" behavior."" Correspondingly,
the initial focus of attention in Llewellyn's study would be the
outcomes of cases, what the judges were actually doing, and on
attaining as detailed a knowledge as possible of the underlying
facts. The opinion, i.e., the way judges described the process of
rule-applying by which they allegedly reached a particular result, the recapitulation of the legal reasoning they claim to have
followed, would be treated as "native explanation" and assigned
only a second-order significance. Hence, an opinion was to ''1be
12
regarded as the "frock coat and black hat of black-letter law,

how a decision had to be dressed up before being fit for polite
109See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.BA. J. 71 (1928). Oliphant was a colleague of Llewellyn's on the Columbia faculty before the "deanship crisis." See supra note 21. Llewellyn thanked him in the sales casebook for "long-continued
discussions... of analysis in terms of significant type fact set ups ... ."SALES CASEBOOK,
supra note 48, at xxiii.
110 See MALINOWSKI, supra note 84.
CLSA, supra note 3, § 40, at 47 n.2. Cf. Next Step, supra note 21, at 454
(describing "the work of a modem ethnographer" as "substitut[ing] painstaking objective description of practice, for local report of what the practice is, or for (what is worse)
a report either of local practice or of local ideology pleasantly distorted by the observer's
own home-grown conventions").
112Id. § 63, at 93.
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society. It reflected more a psychological need to rationalize, to
provide a retrospective "justification" for "a conclusion already
reached on other grounds." 13
When studied with a close eye on the outcomes, on what
judges were actually doing, these opinions and their "rules" displayed in reality a doctrinal "elasticity . . . allowing any case
precedent, whenever there is some sort of doubt, either to expand or contract, as required by the question before the
court."' 14 Or, as indicated earlier, their verbal surfaces might
conceal real substantive change beneath a deceptive continuity
in the precedential formulae invoked. 1 5 The challenge to legal
orthodoxy, the "natives' explanation" of their actions as rule-following, should be readily apparent. (Indeed, had Llewellyn been
a Marxist, he might aptly have employed the concept of superstructure to explain the function of opinions.) Yet if judges were
not engaged, or were not primarily engaged, in the following of
rules, what exactly were they doing? Indeed, what then should
they be doing? What was the charge to the courts?
Despite the conceptual impediments placed in their paths
by the deductive theory of their function, Llewellyn clearly
thinks that American judges by and large are doing what they
should be doing, with greater or lesser self-conscious awareness
(depending on the judge) of exactly what that is.210 What that is
essentially seems to be a leisurely adaptation of existing law to
evolving social needs: reactive, accommodating and none too
hasty legal change married to a decent observance of the protocols of immutability.11 7 But what is to account for so sanguine
an assessment? How is it that change is possible at all in a system institutionally fixated on the idea of boundenness? And
when change comes about withal, how is its scope kept within
institutionally tolerable limits? If the judicial process was indeed
an arena of legal change, why were the changes so moderate and
almost imperceptible? And why were "differences [between
panel members] over outcome so relatively infrequent in AngloAmerican law? . . [W]hat is it that makes different

Id. § 42, at 55 (emphasis added).
Id. § 41, at 50 (footnote omitted).
"' See supra text accompanying note 89.
* CLSA, supra note 3, § 56, at 78-79 & § 63, at 94.
See id. § 8b, § 47, at 58-59.
1
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judges-apparently despite their divergent analyses-still reach
the same result?" 118 Finally, why were the right changes so often
made?
d.

Mum's the Word

The beginnings of an answer lie in Llewellyn's theory of the
nature of language and its use in the legal process. Linguists
have theorized that, while new words are constantly being created, the basic wordstock of a language, its core vocabulary and
fund of recombinant lexemes, is relatively stable, replaced on
the order of once every 5000 years.11 9 The inability of relatively
stable human language to limn with precision newly perceived
phenomena and newly felt emotional configurations is a commonplace of scientists and poets. Yet lumbering and inexact as
they are, man's natural languages, hereditary and retrospective,
are used perforce to assimilate and convey the data of experience, mixing stability with change in varying measures according
to the age.
Law's relations with language naturally reflect those of the
larger society, except that legal language is of course more conservative still.1 2 0 It has an even more tenacious vocabulary, being
less hospitable, once past its formative years, to coinage and foreign borrowings, less flexible in diction, less stratified into "liter1 21
ary," "standard written" and "colloquial" variants.
Drawing on the work of semanticists C.K. Ogden and I.A.
Richards, Llewellyn analyzes the use of legal language in decisionmaking and concludes that, for disputes not squarely on all
fours with any precedent, legal language plays a largely obfuscatory role in the account it renders of the judicial process. What
it hides is precisely the presence of change. Two typical instances of this are the "immanent" expansion of a word's meaning and its "hidden" expansion in the doubtful case. It is pre"' Id. § 42,

at 56 (first emphasis added).

120

H. A. GLEASON, AN INTRODUCTION TO DESCRIPTIVE LINGUISTrcs 6 (rev. ed. 1961).
See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 13 (1963).

121

While these characterizations are generally true of legal language over most of

19

the contemporary legal landscape in America, one area where they are much less true is
in the writings of legal academics, where the common language frequently seems to have
fissured into mutually incomprehensible dialects, m~langes of standard legalese and
pidgin economics, philosophy, social science etc. See generally David Barnhizer, The

Revolution in American Law Schools, 37 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 227-69 (1989).
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cisely because so many words are, by their nature, abstractions
from observation of concrete objects and experiefices that they
often have at once an abstract and a concrete character. In this
duality lie the seeds of dissembled legal change, of "immanent"
and "hidden" expansion of legal rules.
The following illustrations will help to show what Llewellyn
had in mind. Assume a rule reading "anyone who, without authorization from the sheriff, brings a weapon onto the fairgrounds shall be liable for a fine of ten shillings. 11 22 Further assume that the rule was promulgated in "Albion"-an
Anglophone, Common Law country not unlike medieval England. On Llewellyn's theory of language, the framers of the rule,
when employing the word "weapon," necessarily had to use it as
a shorthand compendium for all the specific implements of battle or combat with which they were familiar, viz., those that existing technology had theretofore made available. For the sake of
simplicity, let us say these were four: the bow-and-arrow, the
sword, the spear and the club.
The simultaneously concrete and abstract character of
"weapon" should be readily apparent: when the rule was
promulgated, the use of the word inevitably summoned up a
mental image of one or more of the above implements. Yet, by
virtue of not being the proper name of any of them-by rejecting the drafting alternative "anyone who ... brings a bow
and arrow, sword, spear or club . . ."-it indicated that some
element of commonality had been intuited and singled out, ab12
stracted from the specifics.

22 The highly schematic hypothetical here developed, the author's variation on a
familiar pattern, see, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958); Fuller, supra note 40, at 445-47, makes no
claim to historicity, only to enough marginal verisimilitude to satisfy a not particularly
demanding reader.
= The precise degree of abstractness implicit in the English word "weapon" is by
no means semantically inevitable or a trivial linguistic datum. Latin, for example, has no
word that quite matches the meaning of "weapon": telum, properly "weapon used for
fighting at a distance," "missile," came by extension to signify "an offensive weapon of
any kind." CHARLTON T. Lwis & CHARLES SHORT. A LATiN DiCTio ARY 1847 (1975). Its
paired opposite, however, was the plural word arma, the original meaning of which, like
the German Wehr, was "defensive armor," but over time it came to mean "implements
of war... both of defence and offence (but of the latter only those which are used in
close contest... in distinction from tela)." Id. at 162. Thus to the Romans the arrow
and the spear would have been tela, the sword and the club arma. The more encompassing word "weapon," from a common Germanic root wepna(m), is apparently unrelated to
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Albion's rule against weapons was, at first, invoked chiefly
against rival bands of sword- and spear-wielding adolescents for
whom fairgrounds made an ideal site for their regular Fridaynight rumbles. Indeed, these gang activities were the primary
impetus for the creation of the rule in the first place. When
caught, the youths regularly pled guilty and paid the fine, thus
obviating the need for a trial and judicial discussion of the rule.
For Llewellyn, the fining of the Friday-night rumblers
would most clearly be a straightforward instance of "application" of a rule: fairground gangfights were the rule's specific inspiration and "swords" and "spears" were unarguably part of
the mental inventory of the drafters as they employed the concept "weapon."
The first reported prosecution of any significance brought
under the "fairgrounds weapons" ordinance, Rex v. Hood, involved a young roisterer who was charged not only with bringing
a bow-and-arrow onto a fairground, but also with going around
and holding it, tensed and ready to shoot, at the throats of assorted mercers and silversmiths displaying their wares, until
they finally coughed up the day's intake of ducats and florins.
Before getting caught, Hood had made himself wildly popular
with the country folk, using some of the loot to buy chickens for
every pot, thereby indulging his own vision of distributive justice
and a new world order while having a bit of fun on the side.
At trial Hood denied violating the substantive provisions of
the rule at all: once having heard its proclamation by the town
crier, Hood testified that he always took great care to carry only
his bow onto the fairgrounds, leaving it to his clerical assistant
and factotum, one Tuck-an early Franciscan adherent of liberation theology-to tote the arrow-holding quiver a few paces behind him, passing him arrows as needed. The judge rejected
Hood's technical argument out of hand, holding in the alternative that Hood had either "constructively" brought a weapon
onto the fairgrounds by acting as part of a conspiracy with Friar
Tuck to transport weapon parts onto the fairgrounds for subsequent assembly, or that the bow itself could be deemed an "inchoate" weapon, inchoate weapons being, "of course," no less
other Indo-European languages, so its semantic history cannot be traced further back.
See CARL

DARLING

BuCK, A DIcIoNARY

EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

OF SELECTED SYNONYMS IN THE PRINCIPAL INDO-

1383 (1949). But I digress. Back to the excursus.
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weapons within the meaning of the rule. 2'
While the fining of the rumblers may have been a clearcut
"application" of a legal rule, what happened in Hood, by con-

trast, was almost, but not quite, as simple. A bow, standing
alone, can do little physical harm to anyone; it scarcely shares
the common feature abstracted from bows-and-arrows, swords,

spears and clubs and designated by the term "weapon." Thus,
the judge deciding the case was required to make a leap, admittedly slight, from the concept "weapon" to "a part of a weapon,
in itself non-noxious, for subsequent assemblage on the fairgrounds into a weapon" to reach the result he did. For Llewellyn, this would not be, strictly speaking, rule application.
Rather, it is an instance of the "automatic" or "immanent" expansion of word content, automatic or immanent because virtually any jurist in that society would certainly, unhesitatingly,
have made exactly the same expansion as that of the sitting
judge.1 25 But while even though such a case technically consti-

tutes an instance of "expanding" rather than "applying" a rule
of law, Llewellyn recognizes that cases of automatic or imma120

nent expansion are "very similar" to cases of rule-applying.

Now when Crusaders started to come back from the wars in

the Levant, they brought back with them, as trophies, twoheaded axes, reportedly used by their distant enemies in close
fighting and hand-to-hand combat. Axes, single-headed, were of

course known in Albion, but had only ever been used by the
The court also was unimpressed by Hood's other argument that he was only exercising his natural, God-given right of self-preservation and helping others do the same,
inasmuch as the masses were starving while the gentry and the burghers grew fat.
Prefiguring the best Anglo-Albionic tradition of Legal Positivism, the judge's opinion
dismissed it cursorily: "An exception, demurrer, or plea founded on the law of God will
never be heard in a Court of Justice, from the creation of the world down to the end of
(Lecture V)
time." Cf. JOHN Ausri, THE PROVIN cE OF JURSPRUDENcE Dammsin
(London, John Murray 1832).
Hood, incidentally, was fined ten shillings, which was the least of his worries, considering that he was also convicted of numerous counts of robbery, brigandage and attempted murder. Friar Tuck, of course, had benefit of clergy and thus was under the
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. The church authorities, for their part, spirited
him out of the realm; he was later believed to be in Rome, putting his considerable
financial talents to work running a Vatican bank.
11 CLSA, supra note 3, § 53, at 74 n.1.
126
Id. § 42, at 56 n.11. Another instance of the "automatic" or "immanent" expansion of the rule would be present when prosecutions were later brought under it against
the first fairground wielders of gunpowder weapons once that technology was introduced
into Albion.
124
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peasantry, i.e., not by the aristocracy that primarily made up the
military caste, and then mostly for homely tasks like chopping
firewood. 2 T But two-headed axes had previously been unknown
in Albion.
While stories of axe-to-sword combat were making the
rounds, two more prosecutions were brought under the antiweapons ordinance. One involved an aristocratic Crusades veteran who was prosecuted for carrying a two-headed axe, bronzed
and mounted on an oaken plaque as a trophy, across the fairgrounds on a fairday en route to a noble kinsman's manor. The
other was brought against a peasant who, on a day when the fair
was not in session, crossed the fairgrounds with a single-headed
axe bound for the forest to chop some firewood, as was his customary right. What lay behind both of these rather odd prosecutions was that the defendants had each done something to earn
the enmity of the sheriff, a powerful personage in the county.
(The veteran's fault was having been born into a rival clan; the
peasant's fault was his failure once to tug his forelock with sufficient alacrity.) Hence the sheriff, establishing a long
prosecutorial tradition, now sought to use a criminal statute containing colorably open language to get back at people he did not
like.
The prosecution of the veteran was dismissed, while that of
the peasant was successful. Both situations presented what
Llewellyn would later call "trouble-cases""1 2 because the exact
bearing of the anti-weapons ordinance on the facts of each was
unclear, at least at the outset of the litigation. In the veteran's
case, while the court acknowledged that two-headed axes had indubitably been used as weapons in another society, it gave
greater weight to the mounting and bronzing of this two-headed
axe as a trophy, indicating to the court a clear pacific intent
which effectively rendered it "not a weapon," even though the

'1 Perhaps they had also been used by peasants in the occasional rural vendetta or
domestic dispute, cf. Harrington v. Taylor, 36 S.E.2d 227 (N.C. 1945), but such events
had never much imphiged on the consciousness of the military caste, which was, unsurprisingly, also the rule-making caste. But as the war stories told by the Crusaders spread,
a subliminal awareness began to dawn of the possibility of using the humble single-edged
axe as a weapon, even though, because of its rustic associations, the swells instinctively
disdained it as infra dig..
128 KARL LLEwzuLyN & E. ADAMSON HoEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 28-29 (1941); see
supra note 2.
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axe was easily dismountable and the bronzing did not in any
way dull its cutting edges. In the peasant's case, decided that
same day, the judge ran through the standard workaday uses of
single-headed axes in Albion, noting that combat was not typically among them, but ultimately deemed that consideration
overborne by three factors: the mere possibility that a singleheaded axe could have injurious consequences comparable to
those of the more widely recognized weapons; the fact that single-headed axes had been so used in a small number of reported
peasant conflicts; and the lack of any clear indication of pacific
intent with regard to the axe's use. Hence, it found that the single-headed axe "was a weapon" within the meaning of the rule
and fined the peasant accordingly. Naturally the class origins of
the defendants had nothing whatsoever to do with the respective
outcomes.
Firmly believing he had been called on merely to "apply" a
law he did not make, the judge's bewigged head lay easy that
night, savoring the clear conscience afforded by the proto-Nuremberg defense that would prove so popular down through the
years with most of his black-gowned successors: "I was only
obeying orders." So he thought as he finally nodded off, sleeping
the sleep of the just.
Whatever their intrinsic merits, the holdings that the twoheaded axe "was not" a weapon while the single-headed axe
"was"l a weapon within the meaning of the fairgrounds weapon
ordinance are each instances of "hidden" expansion of a rule in
a "doubtful" case. 129 In the peasant's case there has been an expansion rather than an application of the rule for the same reason as in Hood: single-headed axes were not within the contemplation of the lawgiver when the rule was enacted. Hence, a
finding that such an axe "was" a weapon necessarily expanded
the rule's content. The expansion is effectively "hidden" from
posterity by the subsumption of a new implement, the singleheaded axe, under the old familiar term "weapon":
We regard language as if words were things with fixed content. Precisely because we apply to a new fact situation a well-known and fa-

129 CLSA, supra note 3, § 54, at 75. Lon Fuller saw in Llevellyn's treatment of the
expansion of word content a close parallel to Wumel's treatment of "projection." Fuller,
supra note 40, at 445 n.37 (citing KARL GEORo WuRzur. DAs Jwusr s c DeNmN. (2d ed.
1924)).
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miliar linguistic symbol, we lose the feeling of newness about the case;
it seems long familiar to us. The word hides its changed meaning from
the speaker. What political innovation cannot be introduced, provided
that it is presented behind the mask of a familiar, acceptable linguistic symbol? Although in the law such innovation usually occurs on a
smaller scale, this should not obscure the fact that the process is the
130
same.

Words, thus, are basically stereotypes with territorial ambitions.
In the veteran's case the judge declined to expand the rule.
Again, the rule has not merely been "applied" or "interpreted":
If the new case is brought under an old category, the category thereafter is broader than it had been. But if the new case is excluded, the
category has acquired a more determinate boundary where earlier its
boundary was uncertain and there was still the possibility of its extending to cover this or a similar case. Whichever way the decision
goes, the [word-]symbol thus acquires a new content. It refers either
to the new along with the old or, more narrowly limited, to the old
alone.1"1

e. Arts and Crafts: Lawman's Intuition and the Big Lie
The nature of language and its hospitality to dissembled semantic change explain how, mechanically, change can be accommodated by the institutional propaganda of a system obsessed
with stasis. But before ever reaching that stage (the opinionwriting stage), a judge will first have had to mull a proper outcome for the new case, for a dispute that arises in life's "growth
zone," some new problem thrown up by the struggle of social
groups and insisting on legal resolution. 3 2 Faced with this novel
concatenation of circumstance, the judge must step into the void
and, wittingly or not, choose whether to expand an old rule to
cover the new case or refuse to expand it.' 3 How does he make
the choice, given that the rule itself is agnostic on the issue
presented?
Llewellyn identifies two factors that bear on the judge's ex-

'o

1$1

CLSA, supra note 3, § 54, at 75.

Id.

112 Id.
13

§ 66, at 99-100.
"Naturally I do not deny that the deeply rooted belief that one is required to

decide purely deductively has an influence on decision. I am only asserting this: If a new
case is before him, the judge must move, one way or another.... Thus, the judge cannot
but decide freely, whether he 'freely' decides or not." Id. § 55, at 78 n.4.
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ercise of free choice. The first of these inclines toward conservativism: "the traditional way the law is handled, the operating
technique of the trained lawyer as passed down to him... prac-

tice, not norm; way of acting, not verbal formula."13' From legal
rules that "really do not cover the case"135 the judge has learned
to derive
guidelines.., which will bring the solution of the new case into harmony with the essence and spirit of existing law. It is precisely this art
of solving the new case... that ensures the continuity of the judicial
decisions of a particular time with prior law ....[T]he freest judge's
space for movement continues to grow smaller, and must remain so.
The constraints and socialization resulting from his membership in
society and from his legal training guarantee the continuity of decisions, the continuity of legal norms, and the predictability of the "freest" decision making.3 0

I- Id. § 55, at 77.
235 Id.

"I Id. § 55, at 77-78. This also seems an appropriate place to clear up a lingering
mystery in the text of PR rnzomzmcrr. At the end of his discussion of judicial operating technique, Llewellyn appends the following somewhat obscure references:
It will presently become clear why in my view the conscious freedom of a
trained lawyer means a greater real certainty than a blindly literalist attitude
makes possible. (In all Europe I have heard of only one Bonjuge Maniou, and
in my country of only one, on a high-court bench.)
Id. § 55, at 78 (omitting internal cross-reference). In preparing my translation of
rcr, I was unable to locate any information on this "Bonjuge Maniou" or
PRmuizN
to identify the allusion to his American homologue. But it now seems virtually certain

that "Maniou" was just Llewellyn's, or his German publisher's, mistranscription of the
nearly homophonous surname of the so-called "Bonjuge" Magnaud, a French jurist made
famous by the account of his judicial and political careers in 2 FRAoiqOs GfrY. WrHODE:
D'INTER ATION ET SouRcEs EN DROrr PRrvi PosrrnF 287-307 (2d ed. 1919), and about
whom Max Radin had also written. See Max Radin, The Good Judge of ChateauThierry and His American Counterpart,10 CAL. L Rv. 300 (1922).

What Americans might today call a "result-oriented" jurist, lagnaud, a relation by
marriage to the novelist George Sand, was presiding judge of the court of first instance in
Chfteau-Thierry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and subsequently a
member of the French Parliament. He was a highly controversial judge whose decisions
"leaned in favor of the weaker party, weaker ... because of poverty or social status" and,
among opposing legal theories, he would generally select "the conclusion most in harmony with his liberal political and social views." Radin, supra, at 301. He was renowned
and by many reviled for deciding cases not according to traditional interpretations of the
law but rather ex aequo et bono. For example, he imposed liability without fault, acquitted of theft a woman who pleaded hunger as her reason for stealing bread and granted
divorce by mutual consent, explicitly contra legem. Id. at 301-02. Quite predictably,
lagnaud became, in that characteristically French way, a literary cause c~1~bre, publically defended by no less than the academician Anatole France. Radin reports that the
controversy generated by the "Good Judge" was indeed European, rather than purely
French, in scope. Id. at 300, 303. If Magnaud was in fact that well known in Europe, this
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Furthermore, one cardinal value a judge will certainly have
absorbed from the legal environment, if only by osmosis, is the
systemic preference for incremental over radical change, for
movement a bit at a time along an emerging path of development.13 7 These sociological factors obviously help to account for

the high degree of predictability that obtains over the general
run of cases.
But what of the "always unpredictable" individual case?
Cohabitating uneasily in the judicial soul with the genius of conservatism is the irrepressible daemon of subjectivity and its
name is intuition 38 or "fact-guided decision. "1,39 Llewellyn thus
telescopes a description of its workings and an explanation of
suggests that the spelling error was Llewellyn's rather than his publisher's. My surmise is
that Llewellyn had read Radin's piece in the California Law Review but did not have it
available to him as he read the proofs of PRXrUDIZIENRECHT in Leipzig in 1932. Cf. CLSA,
supra note 3, at xxxvii (Llewellyn's writing the preface to PRXJUDIZIENRECHT in Leipzig
in August 1932).
Radin's "American counterpart" to Magnaud, who was presumably also Llewellyn's
member of a "high-court bench," was one James E. Robinson, an adherent of the controversial agrarian-socialist Non-Partisan League, elected in 1916 "by an unprecedented
majority" to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Radin, supra, at 306. Radin describes
him as "earnest; . .. immensely confident in [his] rectitude; [an] active politician ...
radical in [his] views and sympathies; "who dislike[s] lawyers; and... ha[s] scant awe
for [his] colleagues." Id. He was "our Dakotan 'ban judge' ... much moved by the recitals of plain, hardworking, simple people," id. at 308, but also much given to "violent and
picturesque" language, id. at 307, and far less consistent than his French counterpart in
his rejection of the technicalities of statute or precedent. Id. at 306.
The key to the solution of this puzzle I owe to a conversation with Carlos Petit
Calvo of the Universitat Aut~noma de Barcelona, inspired by a reading of his then forthcoming article, "A Contributor to the Method of Investigation": Sobre la fortuna de
G~ny in America, in 20 QuADERNI FIoRENTnm PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIERO MODERNO
201, 240-41 (Paolo Grossi ed. 1992).
, CLSA, supra note 3, § 56, at 80.
" Llewellyn ascribes the identification of intuition as a factor in adjudication to
Roscoe Pound, without citing to a specific place in the latter's work. Id. § 56, at 78. He
presumably had in mind Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision III: A Theory
of JudicialDecisionsfor Today, 36 HARv L. REv. 940, 951-52 (1923) (discussing role of
intuition in the administration of justice). Llewellyn may also have had in mind a number of passages in chapter 3 of Pound's 1921 Storrs Lectures at Yale. See RoscoE POUND,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54, 59 (2d ed. 1954) (discussing role of
intuition in the application of the law). Pound in turn may have borrowed the idea from
the French jurist Francois G~ny, cf. CARLrON KEmP ALuLN, LAW IN THE MAKING 27 (6th
ed. 1958) (discussing G6ny's emphasis on intuition in the judicial process), inasmuch as
Pound cites GNY, supra note 136, among his sources for chapter 3. Pound, supra, at
182. For an instructive and detailed account of the intellectual and personal contacts
between early twentieth century American jurists and their Continental counterparts,
including that between G~ny and Dean Pound, see Petit, supra note 136.
I CLSA, supra note 3, § 56, at 78.
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how it gets camouflaged:
If one observes a new fact situation and is sensitive to its real-life

meaning, then there is a sudden and (so to speak) ex post facto
change in the meaning of one's prior life experience in that area, and
thus a change of content in the words used to describe and regulate
the area .... [T]he new illuminates and at the same time changes the
old. The "intuition" in this process lies in the judge's subconsciously
using his prior experience and his sensitivity to the meaning of new
fact situations. When a judge fails to reinterpret the law soundly, it is
almost always because he lacks this sensitivity. He sees the new well
enough with his eyes, but fails to see what it means. This lack of sensitivity is almost entirely due to a lack of those experiences that might
have permitted him to recognize what the new facts mean. A judge's
intuition extends only as far as his experience and sensitivity.4 0

He goes on, in his most radical vein:
If a decision is rendered [intuitively], one sees the following sequence
of events: (a) understanding the facts; (b) deciding on the basis of the
facts ("the outcome must be this way"); (c) searching for a legal justification; (d) writing an opinion which contains a justification, a construing of rights. In such cases, the construction is purely a means to
an already determined end. One collects the rules needed for a justification, twisting and turning them until they seem to yield the result
already decided upon.... If a judge is "tempted" even once to let
facts guide his decision,
he will see how unexpectedly fertile legal con14 1
cepts and ideas are.

Indeed, attorneys who develop an understanding of the mindset
of the judges with whom they deal, of how intuitive and insightful about social phenomena they are, will have a leg up on
those who only believe in legal certainty of the old-fashioned deductive kind. While complete legal certainty is unattainable,
those lawyers who recognize intuition as a factor in adjudication
and who have a sense of when a particular judge's intuition,
rather than his merely deductive powers, will be brought to bear
to resolve a legal question, will be able to achieve a much greater
degree of legal predictability than their fellows. 4
But why do the warring passions in a judge's breast, technique and intuition, not lead to a stand-off, or to victory for one
and retreat for the other? How is it that adjudication devolves
140

Id. § 56, at 79.

141

Id.

142

Id. § 57.
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neither into rule-captivity nor impressionistic caprice? If this
"mixed" system of decisionmaking has not yet spiralled out of
control, if the center holds, it is because mediating between
"fact-guided decision" and tradition is self-delusion:
Perhaps [conscious awareness of judicial freedom] would be a gross
political error. Perhaps legal training could no longer rein in a judge
who knows where he stands. Perhaps the continuity in case law decision making as well as the constraints of taking one's directions from
a statute would dissolve if a judge were to lose the belief that he was
tied to one spot. Perhaps he must believe he is obeying in order to be
a wise commander.... We do not wish to make our judges into lawgivers on the scale of the legislature: perhaps we best achieve this by
denying that judges actually have what is in fact the indispensable
power to create law for specific cases-thereby inducing them, as14far
3
as possible, to exercise this power blindly, because unconsciously.

Coming from anyone else, this might sound like the basis
for an exceptionally cynical judgment. But all these factors
working in tandem lead Llewellyn rather to the optimistic assessment that, on the contrary, the judicial system is basically
working quite well. Most judges proceed gingerly, taking baby
steps within the area roped off by rules and guidelines. The
great judges-the Holmeses, the Mansfields, the Cardozos, the
Scruttons-are more insightful than their run-of-the-mill brethren, able to take bolder, more far-reaching strides that promote
the sound development of the law and to monitor the pace of
legal change, making certain that one social group is not unduly
harmed or benefitted.14 And when one of the Bench's lesser
lights gets a cockamamie idea or when even great Homer nods,
the system has a self-cleansing mechanism:
To see an author's name right at the beginning of an opinion is both
meaningful and extremely helpful[.] A certain judge's opinions may be
dubious, his dicta dismissed, his experiments regarded with the greatest skepticism, his utterances construed narrowly. Another judge's
opinions may be acute and insightful, his dicta more valuable than
many people's decisions, his intuition prophetic, his formulation of
rules well considered and confident. A leading judge thereby achieves
greater esteem and, above all, far-reaching influence. The notation of
who the author was has repeatedly been decisive for the law's forma-

143

Id. § 63, at 94.

See id. §§ 65 & 67, at 67. In their innovations, the great judges are often aided by
the practicing Bar's pioneering innovations with existing legal forms and institutions. Id.
§ 65, at 97-98.
144
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tion in other states or in later times. This naturally is not without its
dangers. "It seems to be the prerogative of a lofty mind not only to
enlighten by its wisdom, but to enslave by its authority." But even the
very greatest cannot ultimately prevail with their errors, while their
names 5 give their happy insights the strength to secure the public
14
good.

Llewellyn concludes Priijudizienrecht with the following
passage, pointing the way to the concerns of the work that was
shortly to follow:
Admittedly [Prdjudizienrecht's]exclusive focus on appellate court decisions and legal rules plays into the lawyer's peculiar prejudice that
these decisions are precisely what matters, in and of themselves, regardless of the effects they may have on the society from which they
spring. But perhaps it is precisely here that hope lies. Once we get to
thinking about what these legal rules really are, what their meaning
really is, what the nature even of supreme court decision making is,
then we must already be drawing closer to Life and finding in ourselves the urge to obtain more firsthand knowledge about the whole
purpose of law, its utility to society in general But once our legal fraternity feels this urge within it, the smaller problems-like questions
about the nature and growth of precedent-will be solved through a
new wealth of illuminating facts. 148

B. Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft: World Within World
The argument of Priijudizienrecht was largely negative,
seeking to demonstrate the inadequacy of the deductive theory

of decisionmaking and to demolish the logical pseudo-science of
law. It was also a somewhat inward-looking book, concerned
mainly with the internal dynamics of case law. By contrast,
Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft is a work far broader in
scope. If the earlier book attempted to persuade lawyers that sociology had much to say about the law, Llewellyn's second Leipzig book made the complementary but more sweeping claim: a
study of law had much to tell sociologists about society.
1. Scienza Nuova
Llewellyn's aim in these lectures on law and society is to
inaugurate a true science of law, a "natural" or "social" science
25
246

Id. § 43, at 60-61 (quoting Brewster v. Hardeman, Dudley 138 (Ga. 1831)).
Id. § 74, at 114.
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along modern empirical principles. 147 He is quick to recognize,
however, that the sociology of law could not yet yield much of
anything definite, as it was "a downright unexplored field" [ein
geradezu unerforschtes Gebiet]. 48 The lack of basic research,
with a limited (if growing) number of exceptions, meant that
there was no body of established facts to work with. Indeed,
even with such acknowledged giants in the field as Max Weber
and Eugen Ehrlich, one was dealing not with factual authorities
but only with the insights of thinkers of genius. Hence, Llewellyn sees himself as a kind of Moses on the marches of Canaan,
providing only "a glimpse of the Promised Land, 1 49 aspiring
merely to "open up' 150 the field of legal sociology, to offer it a
possible program. He wished to speculate about what a fully developed sociology of law might one day have to offer, tentatively
proposing a few daring hypotheses and "fantasies"
[Phantasiegebilde]5' about the way legal sociology might eventually organize its observations of the "life of the law" in the
context of the larger society.
In presenting his program for legal sociology, Llewellyn first
provides a schematic genealogy of the sciences in general and
insists on a number of key distinctions. Every branch of knowledge, he maintains, starts out not as a science [Wissenschaft]es
but as a practically useful real world skill [praktische Lebenskunst],5 3 a livelihood, a group of interrelated actions [Handlungs-geftige]' " that comes into being because people have had
some job to do. "The Law" encompasses a number of such skills:
judging, advocacy, counselling and the like. These practical skills
focus on the short term, on getting a job done.
From these occupations there slowly arises a "philosophy"
of a sort, one that often owes its origins either to the reflective
musings of ne'er-do-wells or malcontents on the significance of
their occupation, or to an incipient system of instruction in
practical skills. Such reflections generally lead to attempts to

147 See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
148 RRG, supra note 3, at 20.
149 Id. at 39.
150 Id. at 27.

Id. at 39.
at 32.
15 Id.
154 Id.
152 Id.
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draw together everything theretofore learned about a particular
branch of knowledge, to a "science" in the old-fashioned sense of
the term, a somewhat organized collection and classification of
prior knowledge, but one that jumbles knowledge with beliefs,
with value judgments and prejudices, a "quasi-science." This
philosophy coexists with, but does not supplant, the skills by
which people earn their living.""
Some branches of knowledge, including law, also come to
develop what probably can best be described as "doctrine"
[Dogmatik].'56 The precondition for the development of doctrine
is some recognized authoritative document, a holy book-a set
of scriptures, the Church Fathers, the German Civil Code of
1896-containing fixed, mandatory language that prescribes
rules for living and that brooks no dissent. The function of doctrine is to use these words to devise "correct" solutions for reallife cases. In law doctrine has the obvious value of instructing
the all-too-human judge to let the law (not the judge) decide, so
as to ensure that like cases are treated alike, a universal desideratum. Yet be it legal doctrine, theology or casuistry, all have one
thing in common: not only do they purport to be the "proper"
norms to follow, they also represent themselves as the norms
that are actually being followed. Normative statements tend to
glide over into empirical statements, an impermissible expansion
57
of doctrine beyond its proper limits.
While law certainly needs doctrine, doctrine, over time, has
a way of hogging the spotlight. When legal doctrine makes the
unsupported assertion that its norms are the ones actually being
followed, it arrogates to itself the role proper to yet another species of "law," one existing alongside the art, the philosophy and
the doctrine: a "science" of law in the modern sense of a descriptive or empirical science [Seinswissenschaft, Erfahrungswissenschaft],15 the task of which is the slow and painstaking accumulation of facts, a science that, additionally, must forswear value
judgments so as not to distort the accuracy of its observations.
To Llewellyn, the development of this scientific attitude is perhaps the highest accomplishment of the modern age, one that

Id. at 32-34.
IN Id. at 35.
15

157

Id. at 37.

158Id. at 29 & 38.
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has led to enduring progress in all fields where it has been
introduced.18 9
The enthusiasm of his panegyric notwithstanding, Llewellyn
is hardly a naive cheerleader for the scientific ideal. For he also
displays a sophisticated understanding of modern science's epistemological problems. He recognizes, for example, that even a
descriptive science is not exactly value-free. Its values are rather
of a different sort: a responsibility only to facts; a skepticism
about assumptions; a refusal to accept anyone's authority without proof; a need for results verifiable by others. He also freely
admits that the way in which science poses a question and the
particular conceptual abstractions the scientist uses to divide up
his perceptions of raw existence will naturally determine both
what is observed and how the observer sees it, i.e., the problem
that a modern philosopher of science has described as the "theory-laden" character of scientific observations. But at least this
sort of science strives to be consciously aware of its own limitations, thus allowing for correctives to such distortions. 160
With all its shortcomings, this is the model of science Llewellyn embraces for the sociology of law. This is, however, precisely the sort of science that has, for the most part,0 1 been conspicuously lacking in the law:
I would maintain that in this topsy-turvy world the central problem of
all of law has to do with this still almost completely neglected descrip-

189 Id. at 34.

o Id. at 34-35. See N.F. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DiscovERY (1958) (discussing "theory-laden" character of scientific observations). This recognition of the limits of the scientific method suggests that Llewellyn's reading in scientific theory must have been
fairly wide and deep, for one wonders how commonplace such a realization was in the
early 1930's. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 99, at 21-22 (discussing "modern" ideas on the
limitations of science and citing "contemporary" writers in the philosophy of science and
epistemology, none earlier than 1958). See also Hannah Arendt, The Conquest of Space
and the Stature of Man, in HANNAH ARENDr, BETWEEN PAST AND FtrrRE 265, 276-80,
300-01 n.23 (enlarged ed. Penguin Books 1977) (1968) (discussing the injection of the
human observer into science and the limits of scientific measurement, based on Werner
Heisenberg's "popular" statements of his Uncertainty Principle from the 1950s). If he
had not already done so, one place he may have encountered such caveats was in Mortimer J. Adler's book review of Jerome Frank's LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note
103, one of three contributions to the symposium on this work in which Llewellyn also
participated. See Mortimer J. Adler, Legal Certainty, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 91, 92 (1931).
11 Llewellyn attributed the beginnings of the descriptive science of law to the socalled "Free Law Movement." RRG, supra note 3, at 38. Cf. Herget & Wallace, supra
note 19, at 443-45 (quoting passages from the works of Eugen Ehrlich and Ernst Fuchs
advocating a more empirical, social-science approach to the study of law).
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tive science, with this "legal sociology," this natural science of living
law [Naturwissenschaft des Rechtlebens]. What we need to study,
what we must know, is not how a legal rule reads, nor how a philosophically correct rule would read, but what the legal rule means. Not
in its "intended sense," and not in the clouds, the heaven of legal concepts, but in human experience. What happens in life with it? What
does a law mean to ordinary people? If ever it was enough, today it
surely is not enough to set up an "ideal" norm and, whenever anything is found wanting in its "interpretation," to attribute it, with a
shrug, to human weakness. In Life, Law means what Law delivers [Im
Leben bedeutet Recht, was Recht leistet]; no more, no less. 83

Llewellyn of course knew that legal sociology was not "the
law."' 63 He states, as he generally did in such contexts,'' that he
has no wish to supplant any of the other approaches to law, including the doctrinal, with his sociological approach. "It is not
that words are unimportant, but that actions have been neglected." '16 5 Given their history of prior neglect, he believes he
must now overemphasize them even at the cost of creating a car0
icature, a depiction that at least is very easy to understand.c"
Yet the focus of the impending scientific inquiry into "what
law meant in real life" and into "what law delivered" still
needed considerable sharpening. Which slice of life was to be
considered? How, in fact, would "law" be defined for purposes of

sociological study? Llewellyn rejects as unusable the Historical
School's167 and Eugen Ehrlich's"25 virtual identification of law

"I RRG, supra note 3, at 38. For those who might think the phrase "the central
problem of all of law" just a tad hyperbolic, Llewellyn does give an explanation. Accurate
scientific knowledge of what legal rules "deliver" in real life is desirable not just because
it satisfies a disinterested spirit of inquiry, but also because such knowledge is an indispensable element in devising effective answers to questions about what the law in the
real world "ought" to be. Id. at 39.
18 Id. at 32; see also CLSA, supra note 3, at xxxviiL
184 Cf. the well-known discussion of the "temporary divorce of Is and Ought" in
Llewellyn's roughly contemporaneous Some Realism, supra note 21, at 1236-37.
RRG, supra note 3, at 53.
18

Id.

at 43.

The "Historical School" was a nineteenth century movement in Continental jurisprudence begun by Gustav von Hugo (1764-1844), a Roman law Scholar at the University of Gottingen, and continued by Friedrick Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), Profesor of
Law at Berlin and later Prussian Minister of Justice, the movement's "unquestioned
head." 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & Hxm KoTz. AN INTRODUCTION TO CoMPARATIVE LAw 144
(Tony Weir trans. 2d rev. ed. 1987). In the Anglo-American world a well-knowm figure
whose ideas had much in common with those of the Historical School is Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888), author of the oft-cited ANcwENT LAw (1861).
A Romantic reaction against the rationalistic, natural-law jurisprudence of the En18?
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with custom: were one to focus on "customary" behavior, this
would leave nothing left t6 distinguish a sociology of law, of distinctively legal behavior, from sociology tout court.169 Instead,
he considers the approach of Max Weber, who, viewing law as a
separate subsystem [Sondersystem] within society, focused his
attention on the activity of a separate "law staff" [Rechtsstab],
i.e., legal officialdom, the law's enforcement personnel in the
widest sense of the phrase. He quotes with approval Weber's
definition of law: "A [social] ordering should be called. . . law if
it is externally guaranteed by the chance of (physical or psychological) compulsion through the activities of a staff of men who
expressly focus on such matters directed at producing its observance or punishing its violation.

' 17 0

But Llewellyn's reaction to

this definition was not uncritical; he had a number of reservations 7 ' He thought, for -example, that the "staff" under considlightenment, the Historical School
saw law as a historically determined product of civilization, having its roots
deep in the spirit of the people and maturing there in long processes. Like
language, poetry, and religion, law is the product not of the formative reason of
a particular legislator, but an organic growth, rather lke a plant, of the 'inner
secret powers' of the 'spirit of the people' working through history. For the
adherents of the Historical School, all true law is customary law, developed,
handed down, and captured in usage and manners; the law-bearers are the people and, as the people's representatives, the lawyers.
ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra, at 144-45. See also Hugo, Gustav von and Savigny, Friedrich
Carl von, in DAvm M. WALKm. THE OxFoRD COMPANION TO LAW 590, 1103-04 (1980).
1" Eugen Ehrlich (1862-41918), by many considered to be the founder of legal sociology, was for most of his career Professor of Roman Law at the University of Czernowitz
in the Bukovina. An adherent of the "Free Law" movement, see supra notes 19 & 154,
Ehrlich's best known work is his FuNDAmENTAL PRINciLEs OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
(1913). The element of his thinking that Llewellyn here declines to adopt is Ehrlich's
concept of lebendes Recht, "living law," by which he meant "law as expressed in social
conduct" or "current customary law." See N.S. Timasheff, Ehrlich, Eugen, in 4 IN'L
ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. Sci. 540, 541 (David L. Sills ed. 1968).
'g RRG, supra note 3, at 44-45.
17 Id. at 45 (quoting MAX WEBER,WIRTSCHAFT uND GESELLSCHAFT 17). It is impossible to tell from Llewellyn's citation whether he is citing to the original edition of 1922 or
the "enlarged" edition of 1925. See Max Rheinstein, Introduction to MAX WEBER, LAW
IN ECONOMY AND SocIETy xxv n.1 (Max Rheinstein ed. & Max Rheinstein & Edward Shils
trans. 1954) (describing publication history of WmTSCHAFr UND GESELLSCHAFr).
171 In addition to the other qualifications mentioned in the main text, Llewellyn
also
criticized Weber's unduly narrow definition of "action" as "behavior to which the actor(s) assign a subjective meaning," which Llewellyn, ever the pragmatist, saw as disturbingly ambiguous and indeed pointless. He noted that Weber himself seems to have
ignored this definition virtually everywhere else in his work. RRG, supra note 3, at 46.
Furthermore, Weber's definition, by focusing on a "guaranteed" social order, appears to leave no room for change. Instead, Weber treated changes in social order under
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eration should be limited only to the law staff set up by the
State7 2 and the relevant activities only those directed toward
dispute resolution or aimed at "channeling" people's behavior in
a particular direction.'"
But thus qualified, Llewellyn essentially adopted Weber's
discrete focus on the activities of the law staff 74 as his own definition of "law" for purposes of legal sociology, that is, "law in
action' 117 5 or "law in fact. 176 This was decidedly not a definition
of narrow interest only to specialists in the sociology of law; it
was this very same "law-in-fact," rather than law-in-books, that
was of greatest moment to practicing attorneys. Furthermore,
the definition highlighted the opposition between law as "observable behavior," Llewellyn and Weber's usage, and law as
"intended meaning," "rule," "ideal," "normative concept" and
"explanation by the court," the latter all typical elements of
traditional definitions of law.'7 All these surely existed and
might influence the law staff's behavior, but they were phenomena of a second order.
Thus defined, it further became clear that a descriptive science of "law-in-action" is not, and cannot be, an abstract intel-

his concept of "Herrschaft," domination. Llewellyn agrees that, while conceptually it is
very useful to keep separate the concepts "maintenance of order" and "change of order,"
in practice they are inextricably bound together. Hence, he proposed to blend some of
Weber's Herrschaft into his treatment of "law." Id.
Llewellyn notes that Weber's definition is broad enough to encompass the
U2
processes by which order is maintained in a four-person family, a school classroom or a
workers' union. Id. at 46.
17 The effect of this is to exclude such frequent law-staff activities as official announcements of what rules the staff is following or will follow in the future and investigative activities when violations are alleged to have occurred. Id. at 47.
MThe phrase "law staff," while a "correct" translation of the German Rechtsstab
and used by Rheinstein and Shils in their English translation of Weber, see supra note
169, is at best unidiomatic English. At times it helps in understanding the sense of certain passages in Llewellyn's second Leipzig book by mentally replacing "law staff" and
"legal officials" with "the judiciary" and "judges," naturally at some cost to Llewellyn's
full meaning. But while the concept of "law staff" quite obviously embraces more than
just the judiciary, judges are a major component of that "staff" and in Common Law are
seen as the most important.
15 The phrase is that of Roscoe Pound and was occasionally borrowed by Llewellyn
in his English writings. See Next Step, supra note 21, at 435 n.3.
176 Llewellyn had qualms about using the ordinary German word for law, Recht, to
describe these law-staff activities because of the deeply-rooted usage of Recht to mean
"system of norms." Hence his coinage: Trecht, whose invented etymology he gives as Tat
[deed, action] + Recht [law]. Hence, roughly: "law-in-fact" RRG, supra note 3, at 48.
177

rd.
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lectual discipline [Geisteswissenschaft]. Rather, it is and must
be a social science.178
2.

Have We Been Regular?

Llewellyn now poses a question that he had earlier broached
in Priijudizienrecht:can any sort of "regularity" 179 -typically
viewed as a hallmark of a legal system, in contradistinction to
arbitrariness-be found in the law staff's actions? If regularity
can be found, how can its presence be accounted for?
One infallible test that Llewellyn believed would demonstrate the presence of such regularity is if a trained lawyer,
aware of the facts and circumstances of a case, is better able to
predict its outcome than an otherwise equally capable layman.
Clearly the answer is yes. Note that this does not mean the lawyer will be able to predict the court's asserted basis for the outcome, the "rule of law" on which it rests its decision, but only
that, compared to a layman, a lawyer will be more likely to divine the ultimate upshot. But it is equally clear that this regularity comes coupled with some quantum of irregularity. Even a
good lawyer cannot make predictions with 100 percent accuracy,
and two good lawyers frequently disagree in their predictions.
Thus, there is indeed regularity in the system, but much less
than legal textbooks would have us believe. The precise amount
of regularity cannot be studied as a general proposition, but only
area by area and fact situation by fact situation.180
a. The Same Old Rut
[W]hat is it that makes different judges
-apparently despite their divergent
analyses-still reach the same result? 181

To what is this regularity, however paltry [dflrftige],182 to be

178

Id. at 49.

In Priijudizienrecht"regularity" went by the name "predictability" or "calculability." See, e.g., CLSA, supra note 3, § 8b, at 11.
179

180 RRG, supra note 3, at 52-54.
181 CLSA, supra note 3, § 42, at 56.

182 RRG, supra note 3, at 54. It is somewhat odd that Llewellyn should here qualify
the amount of regularity obtainable as "paltry" or "scanty." Cf. id. (opining that the
hesitancy of practicing lawyers to predict the outcome of litigation is much truer to life
than the specious predictability of textbook law). On the other hand, the whole tenor of
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ascribed? In the first instance, it can most likely be ascribed to
force of habit, present in all persons, including lawyers. It is simply easier to do over again what one has already done once
before, particularly if it was hard doing it the first time. Often
one is not even conscious of repeating something. When one always sticks the same arm into a coatsleeve first, or puts the
same shoe on first in the morning, is it because considerations of
practicality, a legal rule or some social norm so requires? Of
course not. The way a legal official sets about attacking a case,
Llewellyn thinks, is not fundamentally different from putting on
a coat or a shoe. This rather inglorious explanation of legal certainty would no doubt have sat rather poorly with members of
the American legal establishment, used to thinking of themselves as guardians of right and dispensers of justice.
Llewellyn then offers a few more unflattering metaphors for
the judicial process, this time to describe how the law gets
changed. Before a "law official"-typically, the judge-will ever
try anything new, something has to be "not quite right" about
the old solution: the standard solution will first have to provoke
a feeling of unease [Unwohlsein] strong enough to exceed the
threshold of irritation [Reizschwelle].28 3 At this point, judges

and legal officials behave like rats in laboratory cages, going over
the same steps they did before in hopes of getting to their goal
one more time. If this does not work, they treat the case as
though it were an optical illusion [Vexierspiel],'" twisting and
turning it until the solution appears. Subsequent, retrospective

his analysis in this work, see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 170-178 (describing
forces operating to promote consistency over time in law staff behavior), as well as in
PRXmmizNRECH, see, e.g., CLSA, supranote 3, § 8b, at 11, § 43, at 60, §§ 55-57, is that

there is a fairly sizable amount of certainty to be had. Llewellyn was here probably just
trying to be cautious, but it does give one pause.
'" The concept of "irritation" as a stimulus for creative thought and the whole
"habit/trial-and-error" description of the decision-making process is an obvious debt of
LIewellyn's to the ideas of one of his intellectual heroes and Columbia colleagues, the
Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. Cf. JOHN E. S,rrH, PURPosE AND THOUGHT. TIE
23 (1978) (discussing the role of "the irritation of doubt" in
MEANING OF PRAG TLs

thought of Dewey and fellow Pragmatist C.S. Peirce); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L REv. 787, 798, 802 (1989) (discussing habit, inquiry into
habit-related problems and problem-solving in John Dewey's thought). For Llewellyn's
relations with Dewey, see TWINING, supra note 1, passim, especially 422 n.130. The concept of trial and error in response to some stimulus also owes something to the American
sociologist William Graham Sumner. See id. at 92.
I" RRG, supra note 3, at 55.
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reflection on how this actually happened is called an "opinion,"
and bears as much relation to how one actually got to the solution as does subsequent reflection on how one actually figured
out an optical illusion.
Add to habit another kind of repetition: tradition. Legal apprentices-apprentice judges, apprentice advocates and apprentice lawyers in general-learn the traditional ways of doing
things from the older generation, sometimes without being consciously aware that they are learning anything, such as a tone of
voice for addressing the court or use of hand gestures in oral
argument to heighten or relieve tension. They simply accept the
craft's given ways of doing things [Handwerks-Gegebenheiten]
as part of the environment. These craft habits play a powerful
role in ensuring continuity of law. 185 An additional factor that
helps to account for consistency in law staff behavior is simply
the similarity in the law staff's personnel arising from their common training and experience, which gradually levels out some of
the original differences in their personalities.186
b. Doing About as Expected
To repetition by force of habit there is then added, Llewellyn notes, an ethical or normative factor, providing a bridge
from individual to social habit. What is repeated comes to be
expected. "What is expected to happen, willy-nilly, instinctively
becomes what is supposed to happen [Das Erwartete wird
triebhaft, ohne Wollen, zum Gesollten]. 1

87

That it should hap-

pen is judged "good," "correct," "moral" and "just"; for it not to
happen is judged "bad." What was at first merely a matter of
fact now has become a matter of ethics, a process Ehrlich called
"the normative power of the actual."1 88
This gradually developing ethical norm, "what has happened is what is supposed to happen," is one of two fundamental norms Llewellyn says the lay public (and legal officials too)
impose on the legal system. It takes the form: "make sure this
case is treated the way you have previously treated essentially
"'

Id. at 56-57.

186 Id. at 64.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 57. Cf. infra text accompanying note 202 (discussing the ethical force of
"simplified" images of recurrent past behavior).
'17
1"
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similar cases." The other norm is simply: "decide justly." To follow one norm or both norms consistently is, in Llewellyn's view,
simply unattainable. In most difficult cases they8 are at odds.
Lawyers and the public are asking the impossible.2
c. A Role for Rules?
This impasse between justice and regularity, however, leads
to the discovery of leeway, a space, admittedly bounded, within
which a judge may act freely. That is, a judge may adjudicate
"justly" or may treat this case as all other such cases were
treated. But it also leads to the creation of concrete rules of law.
These rules aim either at striking a balance between the sense of
justice and a need to abide by the old ways, or at defining, at
"nailing down," "the Just" or "What Was Done in the Past" in
order to control the future.190 This relieves judges of some of the
awful burden of responsibility and simultaneously protects the
public against judicial missteps. The existence of legal rules, in
turn, then leads to the development of another professional skill:
the ability to disguise all innovations as decisions compelled by
precedent or statute.19 '
Naturally, Llewellyn does not deny that the existence of legal rules is one more factor leading to some increase in the regularity of law staff action. Words are powerful, and acquire an
aura of self-sufficiency, but one that is ultimately deceptive. Legal rules, he thinks, do not by their mere existence guarantee
law staff behavior that conforms to their wording.92 2 For legal
rules, though we cannot get along without them, have only a limited power to ensure regularity. They make only for a bit more
[Bipchen] regularity than would already obtain just from the
similarity and continuity of law staff personnel.9 3
The limited efficacy of legal rules can be seen most clearly
when changes in the law are made. For then the key question
becomes: When do the new words of the law become sociologically valid? Or, in Weber's language, at what point is there a
"s Id. at 58.
190 Id. at 59.

"' For an amplification of this point in PRamIziENPacHT, see supra notes 122-31
and accompanying text.
21 RRG, supra note 3, at 59.
193

Id. at 64.
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chance people will act accordingly? 194 For clearly the words of
the new law are not self-executing. A new provision of law is in
the nature of an experiment. Its success or failure-the form in
which the change is eventually manifested in real life, and how
soon it occurs-is dependent on what a law staff does with it, on
how it interprets and applies it, on whether the staff has empathy for the purpose behind the innovation, the understanding
needed for the speedy transformation of prescriptive language
[Soliwort] into legal reality.195
3.

Social Studies
a. Order

Llewellyn, as noted, took over from Max Weber the notion
that law staffs are just one of a number of discrete subsystems
within society. Before trying to assess the relationship between
law staff activity and the rest of society, however, he first needed
to develop a picture, however sketchy, of society as a whole. But
this was no easy task given the confused, anthill-like jumble
[wirres, ameisenhaufenhaftes Hin und Her, Drunter und
Draber] that society appears to be. 196 Still, partly by tradition
and partly from certain (though hardly rational) knowledge, we
assume that some sort of unity must inhere in society. To let
some sort of order, however fragmentary, emerge, there must be
oversimplification: a focus on this ant, this tiny portion of the
hill.
To Llewellyn the concept underlying society is neither legal
rules nor public law, nor even law-staff activity, but order. The
minimal conceptual requirement for "Society" is a notion of its
members acting in such a way that the number, type and overall
mass of their conflicts do not render the idea of a unity in their
actions unimaginable. Similar to "Society" is his definition of a
"Group": two or more people the totality of whose patterns of
conduct respecting a particular matter can be viewed as an organized Whole. Society is a "Group" writ large, a complex and
largely self-sufficient unit. Such a collection of people, when not
self-sufficient but rather a discrete part of a larger unit, is a
,91 See supra text accompanying note 170.
195

Id. at 61 & 78.

1, Id. at 78.
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"Group," e.g., a trade union, a political party or a club. A "category" is two or more people9 7 with common interests, lacking a
corresponding organization.

b. Folkways
The basic phenomenon of a group or society is the relatively
regular, calculable and interconnected activities of its members.
These, when sufficiently repetitious, are to be regarded as
"ways-of-behavior" [Handlungsweisen]: supra-individual abstractions from many particular instances of people behaving
the same way'918 that are taught, passed on to or, more likely,
picked up by newcomers to the society or group. Note that there
is absolutely no normative component to Llewellyn's concept of
"groupways," "folkways," "practices" or "behavior patterns." 1191
His is a minimalist, purely descriptive concept, containing no
implication that the society or group attaches moral or ethical
value to the practices (although it may). Folkways are enormously powerful in exacting conformist behavior, able over time
to transform the explosive threat to society represented by all
newborn babies, squalling little monsters of domination and uncontrollability, into Frenchmen, Japanese, members of the middle class, and the like. Folkways, indeed, like all principles of
order, Llewellyn sees as unswervingly bent on their own
preservation.
How can folkways ever change at all, if their power to control behavior is so strong? Folkways change because they are not
a narrowly linear concept, prescribing in detail one and only one
type of behavior, but are more akin to a band or a spectrum
"7 Id.

at 80-81.

193 Though some ways of behavior are generally followed, others may perhaps be
followed only at particular seasons, e.g., Christmas folkways; or on particular occasions,

e.g., wearing black to funerals; or only by some individuals in society, e.g., workers versus
management; officers versus enlisted men. Id. at 83.
"' Here Llewellyn again felt constrained to resort to his own German coinage:

Handle, from the root of Handlung, "action." He believed that the available German
words all had unavoidable overtones of normativeness, which the quoted English words
in the main text, used by Llewellyn himself in the German original, lacked. Id. at 82.
The concept of "folkways" derives from the thought of William Graham Sumner
(1840-1910), an early American sociologist. Llewellyn had studied with one of Sumners

students while a Yale College undergraduate. See WILxAm GRAIIA SuUaN. Fo wAy-v
A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNES. CusroMs MORES AzND
MORALS
(1907); see also TwnIING, supra note 1, at 92-93.
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[Streifenbegriff],2 00 encompassing a range of generally similar in-

stances of concrete behavior. The greatest numerical accumulation of particular instances is around the middle of the spectrum, where concrete examples of behavior are most alike. (The
similarity between instances at the left and right ends of the
spectrum is less readily apparent.) This "spectrum" quality of
folkways thus provides leeway to accommodate both individual
characteristics (lefthandedness) and conscious individual initiative. For example, in medieval painting, most elements were prescribed, but there was still some room left for an individual's
powers of synthesis. Folkways thus change when instances of
concrete behavior begin to accumulate in greater numbers elsewhere on the spectrum than before, causing the statistical center
to shift. 0 1
One cleavage that may develop over time, Llewellyn notes,
occurs between behavior patterns in their scientifically describable form-given their "spectrum" character, these present a
highly complex and polymorphous appearance-and people's
notions about what those behavior patterns in fact are. The toleration of folkways for a somewhat wide range of behavior has as
a consequence that, when people, even those of scientific bent,
think about the folkways that are actually operative in their society, they inevitably simplify the complications present in Reality, editing it along the lines of the behavior patterns they wish
were actually being followed. Thus, while expectations for the
future are generally based on what has occurred in the past, here
people's expectations come to be based on a distorted, simplified
image of the past. "What Has Actually Happened" is far too
complex to be described accurately. While people may be dimly
aware of a norm that is in fact based on actual behavior, their
conscious norm, a distorted and, in turn, distorting social norm,
is the norm that comes to acquire an ethical character. Such
200 RRG, supra note 3, at 97. Cf. CLSA, supra note 3, at 85 ("[Social norms] are
slow to become established, often settling in in a variety of forms simultaneously.")
(emphasis added).
201 Nowhere is such unremarked shifting in folkways more obvious, notes Llewellyn,
than in the law's use of unconscious fictions: newly arising situations in need of regulation simply get swept under an old wording, such as the old Common Law forms of
action, the concept of "good faith." RRG, supra note 3, at 98. With this compare Llewellyn's discussion of the expansion of word content in THE CASE LAW SSTEM INAMERiCA,
see supra text accompanying notes 119-31.

THE GERMAN LLEWELLYN

1992]

"streamlined" norms, having become completely separated from
their basis in sociological observation, often take on a life of
their own, and assert their validity, as directive norms, to control behavior. These norms are also able to expand, in fairly predictable ways, to cover unforeseen situations.0 2
c. Folkway Clusters
Just as individual folkways exist, Llewellyn observes that
relatively discrete groupings of behavior patterns, "folkway-clusters" [Handlengefflge, Handlengebilde] also exist that need to
be seen as a composite.20 3 Llewellyn claims no a priori validity
for such folkway-clusters. Indeed, it may be hard to say where
the boundaries are when trying to decide which groups of practices are to be viewed as composites. These clusters of folkways
have at most only a heuristic value: while faithfully reflecting
only known facts, they help us see order in the midst of confusion. One intuitive principle to follow in seeking to identify such
composite behavior patterns is to look for them in connection
with particular persons-(behavior toward a monarch or behavior of the old Polish nobility), places (the Leipzig fair or a courtroom) and times (Christmas, Thanksgiving or Carnival). But one
can also expect to find them in a particular subject-matter context. The same set of behavior patterns may naturally often be
interpreted equally well in connection with more than one of
these principles of organization: a tobacco business, for example,
can be viewed with equal plausibility in its personal, local and
temporal contexts as well as in its subject-matter context. But it
is hardly possible to interpret the tobacco business other than in
its subject-matter context.
d. Institutions
Larger still than either folkways or folkway-clusters, one
also can ascertain the existence of social constructs Llewellyn
calls "Wholes" or "Totalities" [Ganzheiten], large-scale entities
ultimately composed of many individual folkways and folkwayclusters, but whose existence as integrated "Wholes" seems to
some extent to take on a life of its own, independent of their
202

RRG, supra note 3, at 107-11.

203

Id. at 95.
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components. These larger "Wholes" that Llewellyn focuses on
are the institutions at the forefront of the sociologist's and the
average person's interest: state, church, social status, class,
party, nation and the like. Llewellyn also groups with these institutions those similarly large-scale structures often spoken of
as "systems of culture": the economy, science, religion, politics
°
'4
and art.
Llewellyn asks what we can learn by examining these institutions separately from their component parts, as discrete units
that in themselves have effects [wirkende oder schaffende
Einheiten].20 5 He notes that, at least in modern times, people in
society generally first perceive them as "Wholes" rather than as
haphazard agglomerations of individual subparts. The purpose
these "Wholes" seem to serve in society is twofold. First, they
organize existence, taming it and ultimately making it comprehensible. Second, they deal with the unforeseen. These large
structures should be seen as a series of canals through which action is constantly flowing, the articulated organization of the relatively fixed portion of social behavior [die gliedhafte Organisation des verhidltnismii3ig festen Teiles des gesellschaftlichen
Tuns].206
These larger "Wholes" can be tightly or loosely organized. A
fluid "Whole" is when there is only one major organizing principle, e.g., an artistic society, a gymnastics club, a purchasing cooperative. When there is more than one organizing idea, however, they may either be in conflict or mutually reenforcing. The
greater the number of binding interests and their mutual reinforcement, and the greater the density of folkways and folkwayclusters in the institutional "Whole," the more one can speak,
graphically, of the "Whole's" being raised to a higher power.
One might even say that the higher the exponent, the more capable the structure is of defending itself against change. But
generally, what is gained in solidity is sacrificed in adaptability.
In the modern world, most "Wholes" have clearly declined in
20 7
their "exponential" force.
One frequent feature of these large structures is that they

24 Id. at 115.
205 Id.
206
207

Id.
Id. at 119-21.
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are largely preserved by inertia. Change, when it takes place, is
generally the result of an accumulation of small changes on a
"molecular" level, rather than sudden, catastrophic social
change, which is scarcely more frequent than catastrophic
changes in the earth's geography. The nature of large institutions is such that they contain homeostatic forces working to integrate molecular changes into their existing shape, trying to
make the new elements fit into the prior structure without upsetting the internal dynamics among the institution's other component parts, to reestablish a balance along the lines of what has
gone before [im Sinne des Gewesenen]. Hence the longevity of
the larger "Wholes" as recognizably continuous entities, even
when their component subparts have undergone an enormous
amount of incremental change over time. 0 8
It also often happens that a particular staff of individuals is
charged with carrying out the task or tasks associated with a
particular institution, i.e., the phenomenon of the specialization
of labor. These staffs need not be "official" or "governmental."
In a caste society or corporate state, for example, ec6nomic activity and modes of social intercourse can be assigned in traditional ways: theological, legal or social. Once such a division of
labor is present, people begin to divide themselves up by their
folkways, their norms and their whole mode of being. Every such
staff is in the nature of a component "member" or "limb" of
society, with other members of society relying on the staff for
the performance of its staff work.200 Exclusive reliance on a staff
need not be officially enforced. It is just that the staff is presumed to have the special knowledge to perform the work. This
knowledge may be a professional secret or it may simply be that
the lack of time, or the need to do one's own work, prevents
outsiders from appropriating the staff's "cultural property"
[Kulturgut] to themselves.2 10 In such situations there is constant
pressure for the staff to exploit its monopoly position for its own
ends at a cost to its role as "member" or "limb" of society. This
pressure is counterbalanced, to some degree, by professional ethics, by internal reform movements, by the limits of society's tol-

203 Id. at 125-26.
20 Id. at 116.
210

Id. at 117.
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erance and, if need be, by state intervention."'
4. Law and Order
Perhaps the most readily obvious feature of Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft lies in Llewellyn's attempt to link up his
particularized lawyer's understanding of how law works with a
broader social theory. In that context, a number of key ideas
underlie his analysis of the relationship between the law staff
(basically judges and other legal officials) and the rest of society.
First, not only is the law staff a social subgroup in Weber's
sense, but, like all subgroups, it replicates in microcosm the
same principles of order, the regular, predictable behavior patterns, that characterize the larger social order generally. For precisely this reason a scientific study of the legal system holds the
additional promise of illuminating the nature of its surrounding
society.
Second, because most advanced societies tend to set up a
separate, governmentally sanctioned staff of specialized
"lawmen" to resolve disputes and channel people's behavior, this
staff cannot but develop distinctive normative principles of its
own and its own set of distinctive staff folkways and folkwayclusters that, viewed as a whole, constitute the institution known
as the administration of justice. Hence, the staff's ideas about
what justice means and accordingly the results of its collective
practices will inevitably differ somewhat from the ideas and desired results of non-staff members. Legal officials' ideas about
justice, though ultimately springing from the same sources as
those of laymen, drift away from the latter because to some extent they develop in isolation. 12
Llewellyn then proceeds to look more closely at the role
played by behavioral composites (folkways, folkway-clusters and
institutions) in the activities of the law staff.
a. Queensberry Rules
Within a group, Llewellyn observes, the constant contacts
among members and the feeling of oneness or community are
likely to eventuate in "groupways" that sharply delimit the
211

Id.

212 Id.

at 45-50 & 92.

1992]

THE GERMAN LLEWELLYN

space for truly free action. Between groups, however, such frequent contacts and harmonious feelings are typically lacking and
thus the space for free action, a space not permeated with folkways, is accordingly larger. Of course the contacts made in this
free space seldom lead to outright hostilities. Common interests
may be discovered. One party may simply acquiesce in the "victory'! of the other, e.g., letting the other person go through the
door first. Or the dispute may be settled by conventional usages:
'one at a time'; 'the line forms to the right.' There may be attempts at persuasion or negotiation, threats and about-faces. Finally there is always the possibility of an out-and-out struggle,
by physical, economic or intellectual means, with its outcome
determining the shape of future relations between the
combatants.2 1
All these means of settling disputes are, in a certain sense,
folkways too. But here a distinction crucially significant for the
law must be made between folkways that precisely specify the
way (or the socially permissible alternative ways) participants
ultimately will or may behave, and those folkways that, in a predicament, only offer a procedure for arriving at an as yet undetermined way to act. The former eliminate the conflict, shrinking the space for free actions. The latter, by contrast, apply only
within this free space, regulating the way to "attack" the Unregulated [den Angriff auf das Ungeregelte].1 4
The significance of this distinction to law is that it leads to
an illuminating division of existing legal materials. For "Lawe'
[Recht], before it gets separated out as something distinct from
"the Right" [das Richtige], consists almost entirely of concepts
similar to behavior-specifying folkways. Legal procedures, by
contrast, have always had the task of bringing conflicts to an
orderly resolution, although one whose content cannot be foreseen in advance. Thus they belong to the category of the dispute-resolving folkways. Of course, once a difficult conflict has
been resolved, the resolution, the "Law" resulting from the resolution of the conflict, will itself contribute to creating a new behavior-specifying folkway." 5

213 Id. at 102-03.
214
215

Id. at 103.
Id. at 103-05.
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b. The Eye of the Beholder
Of particular importance to the law, being a "staff" means,
in a very real sense, having professional leeway. This is of course
related to the presumption of the staff's specialized knowledge.
All that people ask is that, should they have dealings with
judges and other staff members, the results be satisfactory
within limits set by the culture and their needs and wants. By
the same token, one distinctive feature of law staffs, unlike, for
example, medical staffs or religious staffs, is that laymen are
likelier to get involved with, and are more prone to express opinions at variance with the results of the performance of staff activity. Laymen do not think special expertise is required to
judge "justly." In simple societies, this acts as a significant brake
on the law staff's leeway in performing its job. But in more complicated societies, laymen typically no longer have as much time
to sit in on the process. Also, staff members 2will
usually have
1
developed the art of hiding behind legal rules. 6

Another insight relates to what might be called the "lag"
factor. When folkways change, people's ideas about their society's folkways and folkway-composites do not change at the
same pace. Llewellyn quotes Thorsten Veblen: "A man's ethics
are modelled on the conditions of his grandfather's time." 217 Because these composites are more easily grasped in connection
with concrete persons, times and places than in their "sense" or
"subject matter" contexts, the earliest notions people have
about the specifics of a folkway cluster will be strongly determined by the particular concrete form it took in its early period
of existence, rather than by any abstract "sense" or "significance" the composite may carry.
As with laymen in general, so it is with judges and other
legal officials. It is precisely such "early notions" that provide
the law staff (and legal thinking in general) with the basic ideas
to use in thinking about "folkway clusters." In fact, it is often
the specific form a folkway cluster took in its earliest days that
lingers on as the sole image of this folkway in the minds of the
law staff. One example might be drawn from the law of sales.
The behavioral composite connected to the concept of a "sale"

210 Id. at 117-18.
217

Id. at 100.
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was wide enough, given its spectrum character, to encompass
both the sale of an object for delivery here and now as well as
the sale of an object for future delivery. While at earlier periods
in social history the greatest accumulation of real-life instances
of sales was at that point on the spectrum where "the sale of an
object here and now" was located, as time went on a far greater
number could be found at that point where "the sale of an object for future delivery" was located. Nonetheless, the law's basic
notion of a "sale" quite obviously continued to be based upon an
image of a cash sale inter presentes, long after the typical sales

transaction generating legal disputes had become the sale for future delivery. Like Procrustes, lawyers force new social phenom-

ena into old concepts, only unwillingly making an occasional
concession to the new form in which lay folkways appear. Legal
concepts far more tenaciously retain the form of an earlier clus2 18
ter of folkways than the actual behavioral composite itself.

Contributing to the same result is an important related
force tending toward equilibrium in law staff activity: the force
of inertia-of tradition, of accrued rights, of not wanting to

218 Id. at 89-90. Llewellyn provides additional examples. What, he asks, is the connection between our concepts of "property" and "possession," for example, deriving from
notions of a small artisan or peasant farmer, and the actual way a factory is run? The
peasant's or artisan's notions indicate that use, opportunity to make and draw profits,
the right to exclude others, risk, responsibility and management are not to be
disaggregated.
But nowadays a factory is "used" by the workers and not by the "posLssors" or
"owners." The right to draw profits often belongs more to non-owners (bondholders)
than to shareholders. The workers who use the factory only secondarily participate in its
enjoyment and accompanying risks, hard though it is for us to see the extent of their
participation through the veils of the "property" concept. It is precisely the "enjoying"
shareholders and mortgagees who are "excluded," but not workers. Running the business
is the job of management, which may be made up only of employees. There is a division
of responsibility. At this point, the application of "concepts" becomes more and more
artificial, until finally even lawyers cannot make do with them. Yet there is still the
desire to see through one's old spectacles: a legal "person" is construed and its existence
is then made into an article of faith. Sophistic word usage is resorted to as necessary to
fit the new occurrence into pre-existing categories. Id. at 100-01. The use of this example
probably derives from Llewellyn's discussions with his Columbia colleague and corporations scholar Adolf Berle. See ADOLF A. BrF.u & GAnmRan
C. AMEs, Tim MODNn CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). For a similar line of argument, compare Karl
Llewellyn, Across Sales On Horseback, 52 HTv. L. REv. 725, 728-736 (1939) (criticizing
use of outdated concept of "property" in the law of sales).
In the final chapter of these Leipzig lectures, Llewellyn provides further examples of
this same phenomenon, drawn from the law of contracts and bills and notes. RRG, supra
note 3, at 169-71 & 185-87.
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know, not wanting to be bothered. Yet in the final analysis, the
forces favoring equilibrium may ultimately be overcome by the
forces of change, indeed by factors such as the law staff's selfinterest,219 which may play a beneficial role in changing legal institutions. Llewellyn believes tension between the two forces will
always be present and cannot fail to have significant consequences for the law.
Lay behavior patterns naturally do not stop changing and
evolving when law staffs issue a pronouncement, either by decision or by legislation. This cleavage between real life and staff
practice then sets the stage for further disputes requiring law
staff attention: one side will appeal to what happens in real life,
the other to the law staff's past practice. Such disputes are always the chief impetus for the law staff to reform its practices. 20
The inevitability of legal officials looking at new developments
through the "old spectacles" provided by existing concepts-for
without them they couldn't see a thing-is offset by their nittygritty [erdnahe] "feel" for the development of new folkways in
society and for the needs of the fact situation before them.221
These new developments may slink into cases as blatant fictions,
or appear openly in the form of distinctions or, indeed, as
avowed refashionings or creations of legal concepts.222
Still, when change does occur in the law, it typically occurs
at the "molecular" level, as with change in other social institutions. No large scale change like a codification, the introduction
of a new legal system or a reform of the administration of justice
should deceive anyone into thinking otherwise.
c. All-Purpose Makeshift
The final major observation Llewellyn makes is that only
rarely does society use a folkway-cluster, or the law staff a professional tool, to perform one and only one task. Even if the
"tool" started out having only one purpose, there is a constant
tendency, over time, to use it for more than one purpose. When
219RRG, supra note 3, at 183-84. Llewellyn cites as an example the self-interested
expansion of the jurisdiction of the English royal courts at the expense of the other

courts.
220

Id. at 105.

221 Id. at 172.
222

Id. at 172-73.

THE GERMAN LLEWELLYN

1992]

a need arises, there is a tendency to use means that are already
available provided they do the job. But when an institution is
also used to serve new purposes, there is a high probability that
this will have a detrimental effect on its ability to achieve its
other ends. 223 Liewellyn provides two examples of this phenomenon in Pra-judizienrecht,the gradual expansion of warranty liability for purposes of consumer protection and the development
of the chattel mortgage:
Something is needed, so it is created out of the available legal materials, indeed the materials right at one's hands.... But right away the
misuse begins, as inferences start to be drawn from features of the
institution that were not decisive factors in adapting it to its new use
(as with warranties, where the view is that no rights are acquired by
non-purchasers, even a purchaser's wife or child). One who emphasizes the conveyance aspect [of a chattel mortgage] wants the item in
question to be forfeitable to the creditor, irrespective of the consequences. At this point, everything will depend on whether the judge
can ...

just say A and not also say B.2"

The store of existing concepts always provides the tools with
which judges and other members of the law staff must work.
5. Law of Desire
Llewellyn proposes that it would be profitable for the future
sociology of law to examine law-staff activity in its interactions
with folkway-clusters and social institutions. As an example he
takes up the institution of marriage for closer examination.2 5
Quite naturally, Llewellyn's account of marriage has an obviously dated feel about it, given the passage of time and the enormous social changes that have intervened since the early 1930s,
but it is his method of approach, rather than the particulars,
which is of most interest.
I Id. at 90-92. Llewellyn offered the following as examples: a vehicle's speed com-

pared to its load capacity and durability;, a speedy trial versus a thorough investigation

of the facts; management flexibility in unforeseen circumstances compared to corporate
controls, corporate democracy.
22 CLSA, supra note 3, § 62, at 88.
RRG, supra note 3, at 130-66. I suspect that Llewellyn's then very recent divorce

from Elizabeth Sanford, see supra text accompanying note 22, may have had something
to do with his selection of this example and with his more or less contemporaneous article Behind the Law of Divorce, Part I, 32 COLUr. L REv. 1281-1303 (1932) and Part H,
33 COLUMI L Rav. 249-94 (1933). There also exists an unfinished manuscript for a projected Part IIL TWINuNG, supra note 78, at 66.
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Llewellyn sees marriage as an institution that, from the medieval period through the eighteenth century, was typically perceived as a coherent "Whole" by people in society, rather than a
loose congeries of folkways associated with a variety of distinct
social purposes. In its earliest form, marriage was able to fulfill
most of these purposes without making contradictory and inconsistent demands on spouses. Medieval marriage thus was generally able to regulate sexual congress, avoid disputes over the possession of women, provide an economic unit of production and
consumption, provide a stable basis for one's emotional life and
provide for the propagation and rearing of children. Furthermore, in achieving these goals, the institution of marriage received reinforcement from other institutions in society, such as
church, village, neighborhood and guild. Llewellyn also finds
that marriage served a number of other social functions, such as
the promotion of hygiene, the propagation of one's social group
or one's culture, the protection of the mother after her
childbearing years are over and the regulation of how income
and inherited property are to be used and enjoyed.
As one moves into modern times, however, one finds different demands being made of marriage: demands for greater personal fulfillment; for better-educated and economically betteroff children; for a more specialized division of labor in society;
for a more interesting social environment and hence for the creation of big cities. Those other institutions that had previously
provided a great measure of reinforcement for marriage grew
less and less able to do so over time. Actual social patterns, the
folkways out of which the concept of marriage developed, underwent significant change. The various specialized tasks that had
been fulfilled by the unified "Whole" of medieval marriage seem
gradually to have separated themselves out, with the development of institutions adapted to its sub-tasks, e.g., schools, acting
as both symbol and agent of the separation process. Nonetheless, the ideological conception of marriage employed by the law
staffs and others did not, typically, keep pace with these social
changes. Their conception of marriage continued to be based, to
a large extent, on the circumstances of an earlier age.
But what is the role of law and law staff activity here?
Under what circumstances do lawmen, with their outmoded idea
of marriage, have occasion to interact with the social institution?
Cannot all of the above social purposes be fulfilled without law
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and law staffs? Do the law and the law staff do anything other
than give the state's nugatory stamp of approval to the social
institution?
To Llewellyn law and law staffs perform a valuable role in
achieving a number of those purposes. Law staff activity serves
chiefly to reinforce social conventions where, by themselves,
these are at their weakest. The underlying idea is that law staff
activity acts to shore up elements of social order that society
itself is able to create but not entirely to maintain. Because law
staff activity operates with an image of marriage as permanent,
it is able to ensure that the social purposes promoted by marriage endure. Without legal sanction, for example, the social institution of two people joining together might not be able to survive a waning of mutual attraction. The chief function of the law
in this context is to make decisions about when parties have
claims to continuing rights, such as to support.
Similarly, it is the activity of legal officials, rather than
purely social pressures, that can act to force an irresponsible
husband to support his family or to force parents to send their
children to school. When a spouse is cruel, uncontrollable, irresponsible or violent or when the wife has grown old, law and law
staffs play a similar role of providing organized support for less
efficacious social pressures, precisely at a point where the latter
threaten to crumble and collapse. It can intervene to stop domestic violence and can prevent husbands from disposing of
older wives like superannuated employees.
As for inheritance, law and law staffs provide not just a
fairly unambiguous set of rules for determining rights of inheritance-a particularly contentious area where society, left to its
own devices, proves quite ineffective-but they also provide a
readily available mechanism for answering the related questions
of fact: Was she his wife? Is this his child? Did he leave a will?
Was the marriage ended by divorce?
Furthermore, while both society and law find it equally easy
to determine whether a marriage has been initiated, e.g., by
some ceremony, society finds itself much harder pressed to answer the question of whether a marriage has ended, unless the
ending of the marriage is to be left solely up to the parties
(which for other reasons society might not want). The legal system, by its nature, is better suited to make the necessary adjudications about when a marriage has ceased, i.e., divorce, and
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hence about when claims to rights of a continuing nature should
be cut off.
Llewellyn's basic thesis is that the then standard conception
of marriage, with its origins in older folkways, no longer accurately reflected contemporary behavior patterns. Yet it valiantly
sought to preserve its old form in people's thinking, and especially in written law and the law staff's official activity. Thus, it
had some success in shaping behavior to accord with its praiseworthy image of marriage as an institution: this image had been
able to exert pressure to keep extramarital sexual relations
within "tolerable" limits of time, place, manner and frequency.
But actual folkways, diverging more and more from the ideological construct, had at times been able to extract concessions from
the older conception. The attempt both to maintain the old conception and to provide a safety valve for emergencies, i.e., divorce, had also led to amusing or tragic incongruities in the way
particular applications for divorce were handled. Finally, the relatively modern notion that the development of one's personality
is a major purpose of marriage, the increasing amount of choice
in reproduction and the phenomenon of social fragmentation
and atomization, had taken the problem of divorce in new directions, despite the tenacity of the law staff's attachment to its
outmoded ideological conception of marriage.
III. THE "GERMAN" ACHIEVEMENT OF KARL LLEWELLYN
Monstrum horrendum, informe,
ingens, cui lumen ademptum.
In his 1973 work on the life and career of Karl Llewellyn,
William Twining accurately described Prdjudizienrecht as
"Llewellyn's first project to fall squarely within the area of jurisprudence,"226 in which "[a]lmost all [his] references were to
American works.

' 22 7

Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft is not

substantially different in this last respect, despite Max Weber's
supporting role and Eugen Ehrlich's cameo appearances. The
works are stronger evidence of Llewellyn's early engagement
with the ideas of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo,
Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank, the American philosopher John
supra note 1, at 106.
Id. at 108.

220 TWINING,

227
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Dewey, the American sociologist William Graham Sumner and
Anglo-American linguists C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, than
with German thinkers. The Leipzig books are thus not some sort
of exotica, but rather key components of the Llewellyn canon,
essential for an understanding of the germination of the mature
Llewellyn's thinking. Despite their language and the testimony
they obviously bear to the breadth of Llewellyn's reading, both
Praijudizienrechtand Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft are
profoundly American books, steeped very deeply in the crosscurrents of the American jurisprudence of their day. Ironically, as
Lon Fuller was among the first to recognize,2 28 it may have taken
the discipline of writing in a foreign language to get the young
Llewellyn to make some of his most significant early contributions to American legal thought. For taken together, the
Germanica provide-more than any of his other published
works-the most detailed exposition of the origin, nature and
function of legal rules. These German works thus round out the
sociological study of law that Llewellyn later undertook in his
"Law in Our Society" lectures, which Twining identifies as
somewhat defective in this respect. 29 Moreover, the Leipzig
books' focus on explaining the phenomenon of legal certainty
and regularity through social theory seems decidedly different,
at least in emphasis, from those later lectures' concentration on
a more particularized analysis of the specific tasks set for law,
i.e., his theory of "law-jobs" and the "crafts" of law, such as
judging, advocacy and counselling. 230 Thus, they significantly
complete our knowledge of Llewellyn the theorist of American
legal sociology.
It is, however, not enough merely to plant the flag, claiming
the works of Llewellyn's Saxon sojourns for American jurisprudence. For Pr~judizienrechtand Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft arose at the same crucial time, springing from the
same intellectual environment and reflecting the same concerns,
as one of the defining moments in twentieth century American
jurisprudence: the debate between Llewellyn and Dean Roscoe
Pound of Harvard. This was the event that was, if not the birth,

"
"

See supra note 14.
TwHQNG, supra note 1, at 201.

=o Id. at 175-84.
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then at least the christening of American Legal Realism. 23 1
This debate began with the publication of Llewellyn's article A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step 23 2 in the Columbia Law Review in 1930. Twining nicely describes the article's
contents and manner of execution:
In 1929 Llewellyn was invited to give a paper on "Modern Concepts of
Law" at a Round Table on Current Trends in Political and Legal
Thought.... Llewellyn was particularly well qualified to identify
some of the new trends, to place them in the context of their intellectual history, and to suggest possible lines for future development. In
the first round of the realist debate he missed the opportunity. Instead he wrote a loosely organized paper which starts with the rejection of a general definition of "law," explores perceptively some of
Pound's limitations as a theorist, mixes in some quasi-Hohfeldian
ideas about remedies and rules, and ends with a plea for an interdisciplinary approach to legal research, with human behaviour as an important focus. A pot pourri of interesting ideas, some of them as yet
only half formed, this paper represents a definite step in Llewellyn's
development as a theorist, but it is not to be recommended
to some233
one who seeks a coherent introduction to realism.

It was also an article that came directly out of Llewellyn's
first trip to Germany and broached themes that he would return
to on his second. In a 1930 letter to the Social Science Research
Council Llewellyn indicated that he had not completed the first
"job" he had planned to do during his first academic trip to
Leipzig, a book on law and the social sciences. He describes his
problems with it as follows:
The book on Law and the Social Sciences did not develop .... [I]t
proved, as soon ai' a chapter or two had been worked out, that "law"
was itself an unanalyzed subject-matter. I had known that "law" contained a philosophy, an art and a hope for a science, and had thought
that knowledge enough. I had not realized that a worthwhile comparison with other social disciplines was impossible until the subject-matter of a science of law in the descriptive sense had been pieced to2
gether, at least in careful outline.
4

Llewellyn went on to indicate that, from his work on this "preliminary job," he had produced "an article on the subject matter
The following account draws heavily on the work recently done by Natalie Hull
on the origins of this debate. See supra notes 18 & 21.
232 Next Step, supra note 21, at 431.
23 TwIMNG, supra note 1, at 70-71.
4 Sharp Letter, supra note 24.
231
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of a science of law, now in press with the Columbia Law Review." 23 5 This article was in fact A Realistic JurisprudenceThe Next Step,23 6 published in April 1930. It thus emerges that
one of Llewellyn's most significant writings-indeed, the work
that effectively named the Legal Realist movement-grew directly out of his German experience. The article addressed the
very topics that Llewellyn would return to treat with greater felicity in the book that resulted from his second Leipzig visit,
Recht, Rechtleben und Gesellschaft.
The Columbia piece, quite apart from its substance, also
had a fair amount to say about Roscoe Pound. While praising
him for his lapidary phrasings and illuminating insights, Llewellyn criticized Pound for failing to follow through systematically
and for the indeterminate level of discourse in his writings,
which fluctuated between "considered and buttressed scholarly
discussion . . . bedtime stories for the tired bar . . . [and]
thoughtful but unproved essay. ' 237 Pound's initial response to

the piece was quite positive, indeed magnanimous, very much
the ox disdaining to swat the mosquito. He wrote to Llewellyn:
"May you be spared the necessity of making bar association addresses and popular talks which falls to the lot of a voice crying
in the wilderness as mine had to be so long. Very likely it got
injured in the process.... Better things are at hand with the
next generation. Veni fortior me post me (Come after me,
stronger than I]. ' '23 Pound's mention of "bar association addresses," however, suggests that Llewellyn's stinging phrase
"bedtime stories for the tired bar" had found its mark.
In the same year that A Realistic Jurisprudence-The
Next Step appeared, Bramble Bush and Law and the Modern
Mind were also published, with Llewellyn and Jerome Frank apparently forming a mutual admiration society, at least temporarily.259 In October of that year Frank sent a copy of his book to
his former University of Chicago professor, now the Dean of the
= Id.

2 Next Step, supra note 21, at 431.
2n Id. at 435.
Letter of Roscoe Pound to Karl Llewellyn, April 29, 1930, quoted in Prequel,
supra note 18, at 1326.
"' Karl N. Llewellyn, Frank's Law and the Modern Mind, 31 COLULL L. Rgv. 82
(1931). Indeed, Frank told Llewellyn that his review of LAw AND THE MODERN MMD
"showed a curious empathy." Llewellyn-Pound Exchange, supra note 21, at 943.
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Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound.2 ' The work devoted an entire chapter and an appendix to a critical examination of
Pound's views. Despite the generally respectful tones in which
the criticisms were delivered and the not ungenerous admixture
of praise, Dean Pound could not have been pleased to find portions of his work characterized as "patently superficial,

tional" 2 I

' 24 1

"irra-

and "a small boy with a grown-up vocabulary talking

of an ideal father.

' 24 3

Furthermore, Pound probably was not

amused to find his thinking on the key question of legal certainty exposed as extremely inconsistent. 4 One mosquito could
be ignored; two were beginning to seem like a swarm. Additionally, the book contained a very pointed attack on his fellow
Harvardian, the eminent conflicts scholar Joseph Beale. Pound's
wounded amour propre indeed led him to imagine things about
the book's treatment of him that were not true: in a letter to
Llewellyn, Pound accused Frank of misquotation, a charge that
enraged Frank and one that proved to be entirely baseless.2 4
Late in 1930 Pound turned down an invitation from the editor of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences to write an article
on contracts. Llewellyn was the second choice, but his idiosyncratic work product induced the editor to entreat Pound to work
with Llewellyn on fixing the piece up. Despite much correspondence on the subject, the collaboration never got off the ground.
What almost certainly aborted it was the entirely unanticipated
appearance of Pound's The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence24
in the March 1931 HarvardLaw Review. Pound had never mentioned the article in all his correspondence with Llewellyn.
Even if the appearance of the article surprised Llewellyn, he
should not have been surprised by the manner in which it was
written, having previously diagnosed Pound's propensity for
writing "thoughtful but unproved essay[s]. 24 7 What Pound in
fact attempted was a composite portrait of "The Realist," a
240

Id. at 940.

241 FRANK, supra note 103, at 5.
242 Id. at 227.

243 Id. at 316.
244 Id. at 312-26.
141Llewellyn-Pound Exchange, supra note 21, at 944-49.
240 Roscoe Pound, The Call For A Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HAV. L. R-v. 697
(1931); Prequel, supra note 18, at 1327-32.
27 Next Step, supra note 21, at 435.
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creature who resembled no living scholar but who, as stitched
together by the hand of the wily Dr. Pound, combined the factskepticism and psychologism of Frank, the social-scientism of
Underhill Moore and the rule-skepticism and business orientation of Llewellyn. Pound gave no citations or evidence to support his charges. Llewellyn took him to task for this failure in
the response to Pound's article-Some Realism about Realism 8 -on which he collaborated with Frank and which he
waged a strenuous campaign to have published in the Harvard
Law Review.
What Pound is responsible for in his article, in fact, is the
very first appearance of the "Frankllynstein Monster," that is,
the tendency for many critics of Realism to see it as both monolithic and extreme. The very different images presented to the
world by Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn got conflated for
posterity or at least for the posterity that did not read very carefully or read German-when clearly -they ought not to have
been. This the later estrangement between Llewellyn and Frank
showed: Frank, with his single-minded focus on the judicial personality and his contemptuous dismissal of any need for legal
certainty, was the true radical, while Llewellyn was only a raving
moderate, or, as Frank perceptively dubbed him and
his fellow
'24 0
rule-skeptics, "left-wing adherents of a tradition.

There are portions of the early Llewellyn that can certainly
be read to support Pound's handiwork. What tended to sum up
Llewellyn's jurisprudence, for want of English versions of his
Leipzig writings, was Bramble Bush and, in particular, its "indeterminist," nay, antinomian, discussion of the "Janus-faced"
doctrine of precedent 250 and its most (in)famous sentence:
"What these [legal] officials do about disputes is, to my mind,

the law itself."2 5 How Frankean this rings in isolation and how
248 Some Realism, supra note 21, at 1222. It was a charge similar to that later leveled against Llewellyn himself by Lon Fuller. Compare Some Realism, supra note 21, at
1226, with Fuller, supra note 40, at 449 nA6. For details of Llewellyn% campaign to get

the piece accepted by the Harvard Law Review, see Llewellyn-Pound Exchange, supra
note 21, at 949-53.
24 FRANK, supra note 103, at xiL
2o BRAMwL
BUSH, supra note 46, at 74-76.
251Id. at 3. Indeed, so startled was Llewellyn by the extent to which this sentence
had been made to represent the thinking of the whole work that, for a new edition in
1951, he felt compelled to drop a cite to this sentence giving references to other passage3
in the work containing "necessary expansion and correction." Id.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:705

falsely! It suggests a single-minded focus on people, like Frank's
elevation of judicial personality in Law and the Modern
Mind,252 as the key to understanding. Its implied antithesis was

presumed to be "what rules tell officials to do about disputes."
Hence Llewellyn was assumed to stand for a conception of law
as untrammeled official discretion, a hair's breadth from caprice.
The later Llewellyn, the Llewellyn of The Common Law Tradition,253 interested in "major steadying factors in our appellate
courts, '25 4 could be seen as the standard story of the Young

Turk mellowing with age, repenting his early radicalism as
p~ch~s de jeunesse.
But this story clearly was not true. Had the Leipzig books
been rendered into English, its falsity might have been more
widely realized. Llewellyn never was a radical, prose and personality style to the contrary notwithstanding. He looked at the legal system and found not patternless subjectivity or Solomons
deeming dooms, but regularity, consistency and a large quantum
of interpersonal objectivity. Unsatisfied with orthodox explanations, he sought to find out whence they came. He was engaged
by the ideas of Jerome Frank but passed them through the sieve
of his own mind. In so doing, he assimilated them into his own
vision. "In [Law and the Modern Mind's] eager attack on the
illusion of complete certainty it under-emphasizes what certainty there is; in its perception of the importance of particulars
it well-nigh denies the importance of generals."2 55
Prajudizienrechthas an early section, 8b, entitled "New
Perspectives on Legal Uncertainty.

' -5 6

What first strikes one

about it is its numbering: Why 8b? Why not 10? Presumably
because it was added after the rest of the sections had already
been numbered and internal cross-references could no longer be
altered. This had most likely happened by January 1930 at the
latest. 257 Frank's book came out in September of that year and
For just one example of the phenomenon referred to in the text, see Hart, supra
note 122, at 614-15 & n.40.
See FRANK, supra note 103, chapter 12.
SKAnL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
'5
Id. at 19.
55 Karl Llewellyn, Legal Illusion, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82 (1931) (reviewing JEROME
FRANK. LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)).

"I CLSA, supra note 3, at 11-12.
1-39 of the CLSA were finished in 1928, when Llewellyn taught the
course; sections 40 through 74, containing most of the jurisprudential "meat" of the
257 Sections
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Llewellyn reviewed it for Columbia early the following year. Section 8b is Llewellyn's response in Prdjudizienrechtto having
read Law and the Modern Mind. It accepts the force of Frank's
argument that to hope for certainty is unrealistic and foolish,
but only at the "micro" level, the level of the individual case, the
outcome of which was indeed "virtually unpredictable." 268 By
the same token, it insists on Llewellyn's own central insight,
that at the "macro" level, over the great run of cases, there is a
large amount of certainty to be had.
Frank was clearly a better writer than Llewellyn and his
slash-and-burn argumentation, in the service of an arresting idge
fixe, has far more verve and panache. Llewellyn's ideas, however,
are less reductionist and monochromatic, subtler and more textured and, in the final analysis, more accurate about what they
are meant to describe.
CONCLUSION

Priijudizienrechtand Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft
are among the earliest witnesses to Llewellyn's obsession with
knowing the truth about law, and knowing it sociologically,
through a knowledge of society and of law's relations with society. Starting out in Leipzig, he took it with him through his career; it informed the jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code and his classes on "Jurisprudence" and "Law in Our Society" in particular. He was planning to bring it back with him to
Germany for final, definitive statement when he died. One
thinks of nothing so much as of Jacob wrestling with his angel:
''2
"I will not let thee go except thou bless me. e

book, "around January 1930"; the cases and materials were completed in Spring of 1931;
the Preface is dated "Leipzig, 4 August 1932," at the end of his second visitorahip.
CLSA, supra note 3, at xvii.
2- Id. § 8b, at 12.

11-9Genesis 32:26.

